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ABSTRACT

Efforts of the United States since the end of World War II to advance the arms control process are discussed. There are five major sections. The first section recounts past arms control efforts--those that have worked and those that have not--and discusses the principles underlying U.S. arms control initiatives. The second section describes the factors that have shaped U.S. security policy, examining security in Asia, the Near East and Southwest Asia, the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the strategic defense initiative are also examined. The role of arms control in U.S. security and the Soviet approach to arms control are examined in the third section. The fourth section reports on eight critical arms control challenges and how the United States and its allies are addressing them. The challenges are: strategic arms reduction talks, intermediate-range nuclear forces, mutual and balanced force reductions, confidence-building measures, chemical weapons, space arms control, nuclear testing, and nuclear nonproliferation. The publication concludes by summarizing the prospects for arms control. An arms control glossary is provided. (RM)

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Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 1984

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

A little over a year has passed since the first edition of this publication on security and arms control appeared. In that time, the United States and its allies have taken a number of important positive steps to advance the arms control process. For its part, the Soviet Union has chosen to interrupt the crucial Geneva negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. We and our allies have made clear that we want talks on these issues to resume at once without preconditions, and that we are prepared to engage in productive negotiations once they do.

During the year, a new East-West forum began in Stockholm, the product of Western initiative: the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. Its objective is to negotiate measures to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe. The West has put forward a set of imaginative and constructive measures that would concretely advance this end. In the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, the West has also advanced a concrete new proposal. In April, Vice President Bush traveled to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to present a new draft treaty to ban chemical weapons worldwide.

In June, the United States accepted, without preconditions, a Soviet invitation for talks on space arms control, including antisatellite weapons. The Soviets, however, have portrayed this acceptance as a rejection, while in effect insisting that we agree on the outcome before the talks could even begin. We remain ready to meet with them, both on outer space questions and on offensive nuclear weapons.

These and other U.S. arms control efforts are part of a long-term Western effort to enhance global security through balanced and verifiable agreements. This is a complement to maintaining a strong defense—not an alternative to it. Since World War II,

the United States and its European allies have preserved the peace through a commitment to collective defense within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has been avoided; there has been no resort to nuclear weapons; and the industrialized democracies of Europe have enjoyed the longest period of peace and prosperity in their modern history.

For almost four decades, this peace has been based upon the twin pillars of defense and dialogue—the maintenance of Western strength, coupled with efforts to resolve differences peacefully and remove sources of conflict. The West has sought to use arms control to strengthen both pillars, to stabilize the military balance at the lowest possible level, and in so doing to enhance mutual confidence and expand areas of understanding.

Over the past year Western governments have recommitted themselves to this broad approach. At the Williamsburg summit the leaders of the world's seven largest industrial democracies affirmed the common nature of our security interests and called upon the Soviet Union to join us in reducing nuclear armament. This May, in Washington, the 16 NATO Foreign Ministers reviewed the course of East-West relations over the past two decades, and reconfirmed the validity of the alliance's dual approach of defense and dialogue.

The United States and its allies have on the table comprehensive proposals to reverse the arms buildup, establish a more stable military equilibrium at lower levels, strengthen deterrence, and reinforce world peace. These are goals which people of all nations support. They look to the United States and the Soviet Union, as the world's two most powerful nations, to take the lead. For our part, as the efforts outlined in this publication illustrate, we are doing so.

George P. Shultz

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

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Summary

For nearly four decades, America and its friends and allies have preserved both peace and the fundamental values of personal freedom, human dignity, democracy, and respect for national independence and diversity. The pursuit of peace and freedom has never been easy, yet the West has succeeded because it has remained clear on its goals and united in the means for achieving them.

The responsibility to pursue peace and freedom often has forced the peoples of the West to make difficult decisions on security issues. They have had to bear the burden of maintaining large, modern military forces adequate to meet the threat from potential adversaries who seek political and military domination. The responsibility to maintain an effective defense imposes sacrifices and requires the West to use resources it would prefer to use otherwise.

In the nuclear age, any East-West conflict could have catastrophic consequences for participants and nonparticipants alike. Thus, while the United States and its allies have maintained a defense adequate to deter war, they also have sought to lower the level of these forces, to reduce the risk that a conflict might occur, and to establish a foundation of mutual restraint and responsibility that will strengthen peace.

The United States and NATO are committed to maintaining the minimum nuclear forces necessary for deterrence and, therefore, over time have made substantial unilateral reductions in those forces. In the 1960s, the United States had one-third more nuclear weapons—with four times the explosive power—than it has today. Similarly, as a result of several NATO alliance decisions taken over the past 4 years, the U.S. nuclear stockpile in Europe will be one-third smaller than in 1979.

Thus the United States and NATO have been more than willing to undertake unilateral nuclear arms reductions when that could be done safely. Regrettably, this cannot be said for the Soviet Union. Far from taking comparable steps to lower its nuclear armaments, the Soviet Union has steadily expanded its stocks of strategic, intermediate-range, and short-range nuclear weapons. At the same time, it has continued to build up its numerically superior conventional forces and qualitatively improved many of its systems to reduce NATO's technological edge.

The United States and its allies, therefore, are seeking arms control agreements that would genuinely enhance stability and security, reduce military capabilities, and ease the defense burden. Precisely because of the importance of arms control, it is the subject of intense public debate in the West. This study seeks to contribute to the

discussion by reviewing the record of U.S. arms control efforts since the end of World War II and by providing a status report on the U.S. arms control agenda within the context of broader national security objectives. The study describes the factors that have shaped U.S. security policy and recounts past arms control efforts—those that have worked and those that did not. It sets forth the principles underlying U.S. arms control initiatives. It reports on eight critical arms control challenges and how the United States and its allies are addressing them. And finally, it summarizes the prospects for arms control.

Collective Security

There is an inescapable relationship among all elements of security, including defense capabilities, political commitments, and arms control agreements. It is often argued that defense and arms control are separate and competing concepts. It is more accurate, however, to say that arms control and defense are mutually reinforcing; each bolsters the effectiveness of the other, in the interest of greater stability and security.

Western defense and arms control efforts support the same goal: to reduce the risk of war. One also can see the linkage between them in the apparent paradox—borne out by the history of arms control—that the West's defense modernization programs encourage rather than discourage progress toward arms reductions. As the Scowcroft commission noted in its April 1983 report:

> Arms control negotiations—in particular the Soviets' willingness to enter agreements that enhance stability—are heavily influenced by ongoing programs. The ABM Treaty of 1972, for example, came about only because the United States maintained an ongoing ABM program and indeed made a decision to make a limited deployment. It is illusory to believe that we could obtain a satisfactory agreement with the Soviets limiting ICBM deployments if we unilaterally terminated the only new U.S. ICBM program that could lead to deployments in this decade.

The lesson to be learned is that the Soviet Union will accept equitable reductions that create a stable balance—essential for deterrence—at lower force levels only if convinced of the West's determination to maintain such a balance by its own efforts.

Security in the nuclear age means collective security. History demonstrates that the only way to preserve peace and protect the freedom of the Western democracies is through their unity and common purpose. This principle is clearly exemplified by NATO—committing 16 sovereign nations to common defense against aggression—and by similar commitments in which the United States has joined in the Pacific region.

Collective security depends on the political will and military capabilities of the participating states. Arms control also can make a fundamental contribution to security, if equitable, verifiable agreements can be achieved that significantly reduce the level of forces while helping to stabilize the military balance and strengthen confidence on all sides.

Arms control negotiations are complex. But beneath the technicalities, there are recurring political and strategic realities that must be recognized if arms control is to contribute to security. The most important of these are the common interests of the industrialized democracies, including the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, and the global challenge to those interests posed by the Soviet Union.

Soviet power and aggressive behavior have led the United States, in conjunction with its allies, to organize for collective security—to deter and, if necessary, to repel aggression. This arrangement has succeeded remarkably well in protecting the freedom and security of the West for almost 40 years.

Collective security has been based upon a policy of deterrence which makes clear to any adversary that the costs of aggression would far outweigh any possible benefits. This policy, of which NATO is a central element, has prevented any direct U.S.-Soviet conflict and maintained stability in the North Atlantic area since 1945, a period that has witnessed more than 100 armed conflicts globally.

Collective security also provides the basis upon which the United States has pursued a dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at reducing tensions and fostering responsible international conduct. The pursuit of effective arms control has been an important part of that effort.

The Arms Control Record

Since the end of World War II, the United States, working closely with its allies, has been the leader in serious arms control proposals, beginning with the 1946 Baruch Plan to eliminate nuclear weapons and place nuclear energy under an international authority. This proposal to share the benefits of nuclear technology, put forward when the United States held a nuclear monopoly, was rejected by the Soviet Union.

In 1955, President Eisenhower advanced his "open skies" proposal, under which the United States and the Soviet Union would have exchanged blueprints of military establishments and permitted aerial reconnaissance to monitor military maneuvers. The initiative was one of the first suggested "confidence-building measures" aimed at increasing mutual understanding and helping to reduce the chances of surprise attack. It, too, was rejected by the Soviet Union.

In 1963, the United States proposed, and the U.S.S.R. agreed, to establish a "hotline" to facilitate high-level communication during international crises and reduce the possibility of misunderstandings that could lead to conflict. That same year the Limited Test Ban Treaty, a U.S. initiative prohibiting participating states from testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, outer space, or under water came into force.

In 1968, years of Western effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to provide for international safeguards on civilian nuclear activities resulted in the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Since then, the United States has continued efforts to eliminate the threat of nuclear proliferation while sharing the benefits of nuclear technology through the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Other arms control agreements which the United States has had a primary role in negotiating over the past 25 years include the: Antarctic Treaty (1959), which demilitarized the Antarctic Continent; Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (1967), which prohibited stationing weapons of mass destruction in space; Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971), which prohibited the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabeds

and ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal zone; "Accidents Measures" Agreement (1971), which provides for U.S.-Soviet measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear war; Biological Weapons Convention (1972), which prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons; ABM Treaty (1972), which imposed limitations on defenses against ballistic missile weapons; and the Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms (1972), usually known as SALT I, which froze the number of U.S. and Soviet strategic ballistic missile launchers.

The U.S. commitment to arms control has never wavered, even though the global security environment is rapidly changing, and Soviet behavior regarding arms control has been far from satisfactory. It is axiomatic that, if arms control agreements are to contribute to stability, all parties must comply with them. Yet, as the President reported to Congress on January 23, 1984, the United States has determined—after a careful review of many months and numerous diplomatic exchanges with the Soviet Union—that the U.S.S.R. has violated or probably violated several legal obligations and political commitments in the arms control field. Future agreements, therefore, must include effective verification provisions, and the Soviet Union must take a scrupulous and constructive attitude toward compliance.

In addition, the Soviet Government suspended both the negotiations on strategic and on intermediate-range nuclear arms in late 1983, following the arrival of U.S. longer range INF missiles in Europe in accordance with NATO's 1979 "dual-track" decision. The Soviet action was completely unjustified. The United States negotiated for 2 years and did not deploy a single LRINF missile, while the U.S.S.R. added over 100 missiles, with more than 300 warheads, to its already large SS-20 force. As of September 1984, that force numbered 378 SS-20 missiles with 1,134 warheads and is still growing. Moreover, the United States repeatedly made clear that—while NATO LRINF missile deployments would begin at the end of 1983 in the absence of an arms control agreement making them unnecessary—it wants to continue negotiations and is prepared to halt, modify, or reverse those deployments in accord with an eventual agreement.

The United States deeply regrets the Soviet suspension of START and the INF talks. It is convinced that equitable, verifiable nuclear arms reductions would be in the interest of both sides and is ready to resume both negotiations at any time without preconditions. At the same time, the United States is pressing ahead for progress in those areas where the Soviets are willing to negotiate.

Today, the challenge faced by those designing Western arms control policies is great. But the United States, together with its friends and allies, remains committed to genuine arms control that will enhance stability and sustain the framework of collective security that has guaranteed the peace throughout the post-World War II era.

U.S. Arms Control Principles and Initiatives

In underscoring his commitment to the pursuit of arms control agreements that will strengthen peace, President Reagan has stressed the essential principles guiding the U.S. approach:

- The United States seeks agreements that will enhance security while reducing the risks of war. Thus arms control is not an end in itself but a vital means to ensure a secure peace and international stability.

• The United States seeks to reduce weapons and forces substantially, not just freeze them at high levels or legitimize additional buildups, as has been the effect of some earlier agreements.

• The U.S. goal is mutual reductions to equal levels in both sides' forces. An agreement that establishes or codifies an unequal balance of forces creates instability and enhances the prospect for conflict.

• Arms control agreements must include provisions to ensure effective verification and encourage compliance.

Based on these principles, the United States is pursuing an arms control agenda of unprecedented scope. Today's efforts build upon more than three decades' experience, upon agreements already achieved, and upon lessons learned from past successes and failures.

In all areas, the United States has maintained close and fruitful consultations with its allies regarding arms control positions and the conduct of negotiations. This consultation grows out of the common recognition that arms control is an important instrument of Western policy and an essential element of world security.

The primary challenges for U.S. arms control efforts include:

Strategic Arms: The strategic arms reduction talks (START), dealing with the principal elements of the U.S.-Soviet intercontinental nuclear relationship. In these talks, the United States has been trying to achieve significant reductions in both sides' strategic nuclear systems and to encourage movement toward a more stabilizing force structure. For example, the United States has proposed a one-third cut by both sides in the number of strategic ballistic missile warheads. Reductions would be accomplished through a "build-down" of ballistic missile warheads designed to channel modernization of strategic forces toward more stabilizing systems and guaranteed annual reductions even in the absence of modernization.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces: The talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), focusing on a crucial part of the Soviet threat to countries on its periphery. In these talks, the United States has proposed eliminating the entire category of U.S. and Soviet land-based, longer range INF missiles. The United States also has proposed that, as an interim agreement, the two sides agree to reductions to equal numbers of warheads on longer range INF missiles and has significantly modified its position to meet stated Soviet concerns.

Conventional Forces in Europe: The mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna, dealing with conventional military power in Central Europe, where there is a great imbalance in favor of the Warsaw Pact. The agreed goal of these talks is to achieve reductions in both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe to parity at levels of 700,000 ground forces and 900,000 ground and air forces combined. The talks have long been deadlocked over disagreement on the current size of Eastern forces and Eastern unwillingness to accept effective verification provisions. In April 1984, the West submitted a proposal aimed at breaking this deadlock by focusing the talks initially upon only combat and com-

bat support forces and leaving agreement on rear area forces until later.

Confidence-Building Measures: Designed to promote mutual knowledge of military forces and activities and to prevent misunderstanding or miscalculation in a crisis, these measures can be applied to virtually all areas of arms control. The United States has advanced proposals for confidence-building measures relating to nuclear forces at the START and INF negotiations. The United States also has proposed further measures to improve communication with the Soviet Union on which the two sides began negotiating in August 1983. In July 1984, the United States and U.S.S.R. reached agreement on improving the "hotline," one of the measures proposed by the United States. This provides for the addition of high-speed facsimile facilities to the existing system. The United States and its allies also have advanced measures for notification and clarification of the activities of conventional forces in the MBFR talks and at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, which opened in Stockholm in January 1984.

Chemical Weapons: An immediate challenge is to ensure compliance with existing international agreements outlawing the use of chemical weapons and agreeing to new accords for a verifiable ban on the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons. International attention has been drawn to violations of existing accords by the Soviet Union and its allies, who have employed chemical and toxin weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos, and to the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in its war with Iran. In April 1984, the United States introduced a draft treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons.

Nuclear Testing: Since conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which bans atmospheric testing, attention has focused on efforts to limit and ultimately ban underground nuclear testing. An obstacle has been the inadequac of

Acronyms

ABM—antiballistic missile
ALCM—air-launched cruise missile
ASAT—antisatellite weapons
CD—Conference on Disarmament
CDE—Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
CSCE—Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
IAEA—International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM—intercontinental ballistic missile
INF—intermediate-range nuclear forces
GLCM—ground-launched cruise missile
LRINF—longer range INF
MBFR—mutual and balanced force reductions
MIRV—multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle
MV—miniature vehicle
NPT—Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
SALT—strategic arms limitation talks
SCG—Special Consultative Group (NATO)
SDI—Strategic Defense Initiative
SLBM—submarine-launched ballistic missile
START—strategic arms reduction talks

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measures to verify compliance. The United States repeatedly has proposed negotiations with the Soviet Union to discuss strengthening the verification provisions of the unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which limit the size of underground nuclear explosions. Achieving a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing—in the context of broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions, improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and the maintenance of a credible deterrent—remains a long-term U.S. objective.

Nonproliferation: The United States is committed to effective implementation of the 1968 treaty on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States is working to strengthen international safeguards on nuclear material and to more tightly control access to technology relating to nuclear weapons production.

Outer Space Arms Control: The United States has been studying and reviewing the whole area of space arms control, to identify what would be equitable, verifiable, and truly effective in limiting threats to satellites. The United States accepted, without preconditions, the Soviets' June 1984 proposal to meet in Vienna in mid-September to discuss this subject. Regrettably, the Soviet Union subsequently backed away from its own proposal.

The scope of the U.S. arms control agenda, the complexity of the issues, and the range of interests of the many countries involved, testify to the importance the United States attaches to arms control as an integral part of the effort to strengthen peace and security.

The Foundations of Western Security

The United States borders upon two great oceans and has important economic, political, and humanitarian interests throughout the globe. The principal threat to American security, and to that of our friends and allies around the world, comes from another continent-spanning nation, the Soviet Union, which, like the United States, faces east and west and has access to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

The keystone of U.S. security policy is close cooperative ties with the world's industrialized democracies in Western Europe, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. We share more than a common threat with these nations; we share values and political principles that must be protected, fostered, and propagated. The maintenance of a stable global equilibrium and our ability to contribute to peace in other areas of the world depend upon the cooperation among this group of like-minded nations.

Security in Asia

The enormous size and diversity of the Pacific region, its importance to American security, and the proximity and activities of the Soviet Union require American efforts to maintain an effective structure of security. The presence of U.S. land and air forces in Korea and Japan and of the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific give substance to the commitments the United States has undertaken in bilateral and multilateral agreements with Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand.

The foremost American objective in the region is to preserve peace and stability. In that context, the United States maintains military forces to meet the growing Soviet military threat and supports its friends and allies against potential threats from North Korea and Vietnam. The United States also protects sealanes that are strategically important to the regional states and also crucial to the defense of the Indian Ocean, East Africa, and the Middle East, and to the maintenance of Western access to these regions. The United States also is working to build a long-term and constructive relationship with the People's Republic of China.

Security in the Near East and Southwest Asia

The United States also has vital interests and important relationships with friendly nations in the Near East and Southwest Asia. The significance of this region for world stability and the health

of the global economy cannot be overstated. Our objectives are to deter further Soviet aggression in the region, to promote progress toward Middle East peace that will assure the security and recognize the legitimate rights of all parties, to preserve the independence of the states of the region, to maintain freedom for navigation in the contiguous waters, and to ensure Western access to the region's energy resources.

In view of the proximity of the Soviet Union and the number of Soviet military units stationed along the Soviet border just north of this region and in the surrounding waters, the task of deterring aggression is especially challenging. The occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 brought Soviet forces deeper into the region. In addition, Soviet access to South Yemen and Ethiopia and significant numbers of Soviet military personnel and equipment in Syria and Libya, compound the problem.

U.S. efforts to promote peace and stability have involved a number of political, economic, and security cooperation programs with regional states, including efforts to resolve the Palestinian question and the destabilizing presence of foreign forces in Lebanon. The United States has provided significant amounts of economic and security assistance to many states in the region and has cooperated in other ways to strengthen regional governments. It has participated in multinational peacekeeping activities in the Sinai and Lebanon.

The United States has developed the capabilities for the rapid projection of power into the region in order to deter aggression. This has involved improving mobility and service support forces and designating a pool of forces that can be quickly deployed if required. In conjunction with several governments, we are developing a number of facilities, both en route and in the region, that would be available for such rapid deployments, subject to host government concurrence.

Security in the Western Hemisphere

America also has important security concerns in the Western Hemisphere, as do the other industrialized democracies that rely upon American strength. In the event of a European crisis, for example, about half of the U.S. resupply of its NATO allies would travel from American gulf ports through sealanes in the Caribbean Basin. The Rio Treaty confirms the longstanding U.S. commitment to the security of the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

U.S. objectives in the hemisphere are to maintain the security of the North American Continent, the Caribbean Basin, and the Panama Canal; to promote economic development and the strengthening of democratic institutions; to support the independence and stability of friendly governments; to counter the projection of Soviet and Cuban military power and influence in the Caribbean Basin and South America; and to strengthen U.S. political and defense relationships with friendly countries.

Historically, the Western Hemisphere has been secure enough to allow the United States to concentrate on its European, Asian, and other security commitments. However, the steady growth of Cuban military power and the recent involvement of communist-bloc countries, other radical states, and extra-hemispheric movements in Central American instability have created serious problems. We are seeking to address these problems by promoting equitable social and economic development, by strengthening democratic processes, by supporting

regional diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions, and by directly bolstering the ability of Caribbean Basin nations to defend themselves.

Security in Africa

Developments in Africa are important to the United States for many reasons. African—and Western—interests are best served in an atmosphere of political stability, economic growth, and physical security. The United States is thus concerned with Africa's political modernization, social progress, and economic development. In particular, the United States is concerned about those countries friendly to the West that are threatened by subversion and destabilization from various quarters. They need the help and support of the United States and other industrialized democracies. The Soviets and their surrogates have continued to supply arms and personnel to Africa and have attempted to exploit conflicts throughout the continent. American policy encourages negotiated solutions to these conflicts. What the United States and its allies are attempting to accomplish in southern Africa exemplifies this approach. At the same time, the United States will continue to provide assistance to friends whose security is threatened.

Security in Europe

Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a coalition of sovereign Western countries formed and sustained to defend the interests and values of the Atlantic democracies, is the centerpiece of U.S. security efforts. NATO is based on the principle that Western security is indivisible and that the defense of the political independence and democratic systems of the European allies against the Soviet threat is vital to the United States.

Throughout the postwar period, NATO has had to cope with two fundamental geographic realities:

- The nations and defense resources of the West are divided by the Atlantic Ocean;
- The Soviet Union emerged from World War II in control of a contiguous landmass extending from Asia into the heart of Europe.

The United States is separated from Europe by more than 3,000 miles of open water. Even within Europe, the Western nations do not form a single contiguous landmass. Although the United States and its NATO allies together have more population, larger economies, and are more highly developed than the Soviet Union and the East European states, the geographic division has always posed special challenges to collective efforts to guarantee Western security. NATO has always had to contend with the risk that the Soviet Union, for military or political purposes, could bring superior forces to bear on a vulnerable point.

Not only does the Soviet Union maintain the largest single army in Europe, but its direct land lines of communication permit swift reinforcement of those forces from elsewhere on its own territory. Moreover, its internal lines of communication allow it to choose the point of potential attack or pressure.

For the United States and other Western nations, it was clear in the late 1940s that these geographic realities could be overcome only through a close alliance between Europe and North America. Memories of the 1930s—when the absence of effective solidarity prevented the democracies from checking

the rise of aggressive dictatorships without war—were still fresh. The Soviets' seizure of Eastern Europe, their rejection of free elections in countries under their control, and their attempt to starve out the free city of Berlin were immediate reminders of the dangers faced by a prostrate Europe and a demobilized United States. It was evident that only a policy of collective security could preserve peace and protect the independence of the Western peoples. Only the commitment by the Western democracies to a common defense could deter military aggression or political pressure against any one of them.

Twice in this century the United States has joined with its allies to defend democracy in Europe and restore a stable equilibrium of power. Since World War II, the Western goal in Europe has been to prevent a new conflict from ever occurring.

To this end, NATO was established in 1949 as the formal embodiment of a security partnership of equals. From the beginning, NATO has been a defensive alliance, committed never to use force except in response to aggression. NATO's basic goal has been to demonstrate the political will and military strength needed to deter aggression and prevent intimidation.

NATO's Strategy of Deterrence and Flexible Response

Deterrence is the basis of U.S. and NATO security policy. It requires that a potential aggressor be convinced that the costs of aggression outweigh any possible gains. Maintaining deterrence for almost four decades has been a difficult and dynamic process. The United States and the other NATO members have had to adapt to technological progress, to the growth and modernization of Soviet military power, and to political and economic change at home and abroad. In particular, they have had to offset repeated efforts by the Soviet Union to exploit its geographic advantages and divide NATO in order to dominate Western Europe.

At the outset, deterrence depended heavily on America's superior strategic nuclear power. The U.S. lead over the Soviet Union in nuclear capabilities allowed the West to offset substantial Soviet advantages in conventional strength, deter aggression, and insulate Europe from Soviet intimidation.

As the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear forces, however, it became apparent that the threat of nuclear retaliation alone was not sufficient to provide credible deterrence under all circumstances. Increasingly, on both sides of the Atlantic, it was recognized that stability could be assured only if the nuclear deterrent was supplemented by more robust conventional forces. Thus, in the 1960s, the alliance developed the strategy of "flexible response" which continues to this day.

The basic premise of this strategy is that NATO must deter and, if necessary, counter military aggression of varying magnitudes in any of its regions. To do this, the alliance must maintain a wide array of forces. This balance of forces permits a flexible range of responses capable of meeting any aggression at an appropriate level to defeat the attack. This strategy relies on having strong conventional and nuclear forces to convince the Soviet Union that NATO could and would counter any aggression and that the risks to the Soviet Union would far outweigh any gains from an attack at any level.

NATO Triad of Forces

To implement this strategy, NATO fields an interlocking combination of forces.

Conventional forces, including armored and mechanized divisions, tactical aircraft, and naval forces;

Intermediate-range and short-range nuclear weapons, based in Europe, with delivery systems operated by the United States and its allies; and

Strategic forces, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers, based in the United States.

All three elements of the triad of forces play an essential role in the maintenance of an effective deterrent. They provide NATO with the capability to counter aggression at a variety of levels and confront a potential aggressor with great uncertainty about the level and nature of a Western response. An aggressor must perceive that any attack on NATO could incur incalculable risks, including the risk of nuclear retaliation if necessary to restore the peace and cause the aggressor to withdraw. The effect of the three elements working together is more than the sum of the individual parts. Conventional defense alone would not provide political confidence or military deterrence against the Soviet Union. Similarly, a nuclear force by itself would not be a credible deterrent in every situation and might, in fact, invite political pressure and limited military adventure. Moreover, the availability of nuclear weapons for the defense of Western Europe complicates the task of the Soviet military planner. Together, NATO's combination of conventional and nuclear forces has proved to be extremely effective in preserving peace.

The key is the firm linkage among the elements. An aggressor must never be given the impression that risks could be safely limited and that an attack against NATO might be an attractive proposition.

Ultimately, the most important link is that between forces in Europe—both conventional and nuclear—and the U.S. strategic deterrent. It is this crucial "coupling" that gives concrete form to the indivisibility of American and European security and that ensures that the Soviets could not attack Europe without risking retaliation against their own territory. Thus, it is not surprising that over the years the way to maintain the linkage between Europe and North America has been the single most discussed element of NATO strategy and that weakening the link has been a consistent Soviet objective.

The Current Debate

In recent years, the U.S. and NATO strategy of deterrence has been criticized from a variety of perspectives. For some, the cost of maintaining conventional forces has seemed too great, particularly in a time of economic difficulty. To these critics, it has appeared far easier to move back to the simple strategy of an earlier era, relying on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation as an inexpensive deterrent.

For others, the risks of nuclear weapons have appeared too great. They believe that the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is less important than their unquestioned destructiveness were they ever employed. Such critics argue

that the answer lies in reducing the role of nuclear weapons and perhaps even in renouncing their first use. Some say they would be prepared to increase sharply the expenditures for conventional defense to offset this change.

The United States and its allies cannot return to a doctrine based solely on massive nuclear retaliation, such as existed more than two decades ago. In an era of reciprocal nuclear vulnerability, the threat of massive nuclear retaliation alone is not suited to all or even most contingencies. Relying on nuclear weapons alone would leave the West able to respond only to one contingency—the worst one—with no credible means of dealing with all the other possibilities, from political and economic pressure to various forms of limited aggression.

Conversely, to remove nuclear weapons from the deterrent, or to declare a policy of no-first-use, would allow an aggressor to act with the certainty that risks could be limited. It would, in practice, make Europe safe for conventional war by appearing to guarantee to the Soviet Union that the West would not escalate to the nuclear level if faced with defeat by conventional forces. Renouncing the nuclear component of the NATO triad would gravely undermine the West's ability to deter conflict or intimidation.

Such a renunciation also would profoundly damage the unity of the alliance. It would mean that the commitment to defend all areas of the alliance, including those most exposed to Soviet threats, could not be effectively implemented. Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union has made the question of nuclear no-first-use a major propaganda theme over the years. And it is equally unsurprising that NATO has consistently rejected it while maintaining a broad, substantive arms control agenda.

Some in the West maintain that the defense of Europe is unnecessary or impossible. Those who hold the former view no longer consider the Soviet Union even a potential threat and do not believe that Soviet military advantage in Europe could be translated into political gains. Those who accept the latter view believe opposition to the Soviets to be futile and support, instead, a process of one-sided accommodation.

Neither view is justified. Recent history shows that the Soviet Union will not hesitate to translate military power into political pressure: witness, for instance, its behavior toward Poland since 1981. Nor are the Soviets averse to using force to achieve political objectives, as demonstrated in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and with the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. On the other hand, nearly four decades of peace in Western Europe demonstrate that through collective efforts, the Western democracies can secure both peace and freedom.

The Strategic Defense Initiative

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan announced the beginning of a research effort now known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—a program to explore the possibility of strengthening deterrence through recent advances in technologies that could, in the long term, provide an effective defense against ballistic missiles. The SDI will

focus and, as appropriate, expand existing research efforts in order to develop sound technical options that could allow future presidents and Congresses—perhaps in the early 1990s—to decide whether to proceed with the development of such a defense.

The SDI research program is fully consistent with U.S. treaty obligations. Relevant treaties include the ABM Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviets, who maintain and are upgrading the world's only existing antiballistic missile (ABM) system, installed around Moscow, have for several years been actively conducting research on conventional and advanced technologies for defense against ballistic missiles.

The United States has expressed to the Soviets the view that a discussion about the defensive technologies that both countries are exploring would be mutually beneficial. For these discussions to be useful, they should be in a government-to-government forum. The United States has provided the Soviets with a specific proposal for such talks, but as of September 1984, the Soviet Union has not agreed.

Since the Strategic Defense Initiative is an exploratory research program, it does not signal a shift in priority from the much needed modernization of U.S. nuclear and conventional forces which is essential to maintaining deterrence over the next decade or two. The United States intends to work closely with its friends and allies to ensure that the common deterrent remains strong.

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Counterclockwise:

Bernard Baruch (center) presents proposal to outlaw nuclear weapons to the first UN Atomic Energy Commission meeting, New York, June 14, 1946.

President Eisenhower announces the "atoms for peace" program before the UN General Assembly, December 8, 1953.

President Kennedy signs the instruments of ratification for the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Washington, D.C., October 7, 1963.

Seated beside President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Washington, D.C., July 1, 1968.

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

White House (Bill Fitzpatrick)

Counterclockwise:

President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev shake hands after signing the SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive strategic arms and ABM Treaty in Moscow, May 26, 1972.

President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev exchange toasts in Vladivostok where they discussed further limitations in strategic offensive weapons, November 24, 1974.

At a May 1978 NATO summit meeting in Washington, D.C., President Carter remarks that "Arms control can make deterrence more stable and perhaps less burdensome—but it will not . . . eliminate the need for nuclear forces."

Vice President Bush speaks in West Berlin on peace and security in Europe, January 31, 1983.

President Reagan delivers an address on arms control and the future of East-West relations at Eureka College, Peoria, Illinois, May 9, 1982.

White House

The Role of Arms Control in U.S. Security

A fundamental tenet of U.S. security policy is that peace and security are best assured by following the dual paths of maintaining effective defense and deterrent capabilities and seeking, wherever possible, to increase cooperation with other nations and negotiate stabilizing and verifiable arms control agreements.

Given the rapid growth of Soviet military power, the United States and its allies have had a direct security interest in redressing, by their own defense efforts and through arms control if possible, current and emerging imbalances in conventional and nuclear forces. As democratic societies, they also have a basic responsibility to their people to maintain defense expenditures at the lowest level consistent with national and alliance security.

Western governments have developed and analyzed potential arms control agreements in terms of concrete security implications. They have engaged in extensive preparatory work, public discussion, and intra-alliance coordination to ensure that eventual agreements would strengthen security and stability and would enjoy public support. The results of this work are evident in today's negotiating agenda.

Western Arms Control Objectives and Criteria

Over the years, Western peoples and governments have looked to arms control to achieve a number of objectives, including:

- Reducing the risk of war;
- Lessening political tensions;
- Decreasing the economic burden of armaments; and
- Ensuring a stable military balance.

Given the devastation that would result from a nuclear war, the priority for arms control clearly is to help ensure that such a conflict will never occur. Thus, the primary aim of American arms control policy has been to secure an equitable, stable military balance at significantly reduced levels of armaments.

To meet these objectives, arms control agreements must be based on the following criteria.

Security. Arms control agreements are not ends in themselves. Their primary objective is to enhance the security of the nations concluding the agreements. Although agreements may contribute to reduced tension and greater international understanding, these effects, desirable as they may be, cannot replace enhanced security as the benchmark for judging arms control.

Militarily Significant Reductions. To enhance security, arms control agreements should constrain the parties' military capability or potential. The benefits of agreements which provide only promises or statements of intent, without significantly limiting the parties' ability to undertake military action, are illusory and they are potentially destabilizing.

The United States and its allies seek agreements which actually constrain or reduce forces and make a concrete contribution to stability, rather than merely reiterating existing international law without adding any meaningful obligations, i.e., nonaggression pacts. If agreements are to strengthen stability and lower the level of military confrontation, they must provide for more than token reductions or a freeze of forces at levels that perpetuate existing imbalances. Arms control should achieve a significant reduction in current force levels.

Equality. Arms control agreements should bring about mutual reductions to equal levels in the comparable measures of military capability. Equality is essential if arms control agreements are to strengthen stability and preserve effective deterrence at reduced levels.

Verifiability and Compliance. Since arms control agreements are directly related to the security of participants, it is vital that they incorporate measures to permit effective verification and that all parties comply with the obligations of the agreements. Experience has shown that accords lacking such provisions become a source of suspicion, tension, and distrust, rather than reinforcing prospects for peace. The evidence of Soviet noncompliance with some provisions of existing arms control agreements amply demonstrates how essential effective verification and compliance are for all future accords.

The Soviet Approach to Arms Control

Despite strong rhetorical support for arms control, the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries have rarely advanced concrete verifiable proposals to limit the forces of both sides. Instead, they usually have preferred to react tactically to specific Western proposals and to Western efforts to establish a meaningful arms control framework. Eastern initiatives characteristically feature sweeping and unverifiable proposals or unenforceable promises of good will.

The Soviet Union seems to approach arms control less as a tool for achieving stability and more as a political instrument to secure advantages either through actual agreements or through the negotiating process itself. This has been evident in Soviet conduct with respect to intermediate-range nuclear forces: Soviet proposals seem to have been designed not to narrow differences between East and West but to generate tensions among NATO members, to stimulate public concern, and to achieve limits on Western forces without reciprocal limits on Soviet forces.

The Soviet suspension of the INF talks and failure to set a date for resuming START clearly demonstrate the predominance of political objectives over genuine security concerns in the Soviet approach. Through 2 years of INF negotiations, the Soviet proposals had one overriding goal: to maintain a large and growing arsenal of forces to threaten Europe and Asia, while precluding any balancing NATO deployments. Thus, while the United States—with allied support—sincerely tried to negotiate an equitable agreement, the Soviet Union spurned all U.S. arms control proposals. The Soviet Union was determined to preserve a monopoly in this important category of missiles in order to weaken the credi-

bility of the link between U.S. strategic forces and the defense of Europe, thereby undermining the basic foundation of NATO deterrent strategy.

NATO agreed in 1979 that it would deploy its own LRINF missiles beginning in late 1983, if the United States and U.S.S.R. had not yet reached an arms control agreement obviating the need for those deployments. That was some years after the U.S.S.R. began to deploy its new SS-20 missiles at an average rate of about one missile (with three warheads each) a week. In late 1983, in response to the deployment of the first NATO LRINF missiles, the Soviet Union walked out of the INF talks and then refused to agree to a date for resuming the next round of START. In effect, the Soviets appeared to be saying that they would not negotiate unless they possessed a veto power over NATO's security decisions.

The United States and its allies continue to believe that significant, balanced, and verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals would be in the best interest of all parties. The United States is prepared to return to the negotiations at any time, without preconditions, and has so informed the Soviet Union many times.

Compliance

If arms control agreements are to contribute to security, all parties must comply with them. Traditionally, the Soviets have resisted including effective verification and enforcement provisions in such agreements. For years, the Soviets have resisted serious discussion in the MBFR talks of the size and composition of their forces in Central Europe. They have also resisted introducing effective verification measures into an agreement banning chemical weapons and have worked to impede international investigation of chemical and toxin weapons use in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos.

In 1982, increasing concern in the U.S. Congress and within the Administration about Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements led the U.S. Government to undertake an in-depth examination of verification and compliance issues. After a careful review by a senior group of officials and numerous diplomatic exchanges with the Soviet Union, the United States determined that in seven areas initially studied the Soviets had committed violations and probable violations of legal obligations and political commitments.

At the request of Congress, President Reagan on January 23, 1984, reported on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. The report concluded that the U.S.S.R. has:

- Violated the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, by maintaining an offensive biological warfare program and by their involvement in toxin and chemical warfare use in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia;
- Violated the 1975 Helsinki Final Act provision requiring full prior notification of certain military exercises, by their failure to provide full and timely notification of the ZAPAD 81 exercise in and around Poland;
- Violated the SALT II ban on telemetry encryption of ICBM tests that impedes verification, through heavy encryption, of SS-X-25 tests;
- Almost certainly violated the 1972 ABM Treaty through deployment of a large phased-array radar in central Siberia;
- Probably violated the SALT II provision limiting each party to one new type of ICBM, through testing of the SS-X-25 (or, if the SS-X-25 is not a new type as defined by SALT II, it

violates permitted modernization criteria for a single-warhead ICBM);

- Probably violated the SALT II ban on deployment of SS–16 missiles; and
- Likely violated the unratified 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty limit of 150 kilotons on underground nuclear tests.

After the U.S. findings were made public, the Soviet Union released a list of unsubstantiated countercharges of alleged U.S. noncompliance with arms control agreements. The Soviet publication of these countercharges appears to have been designed to deflect attention from the findings contained in the President's report, rather than an indication of real Soviet concern over U.S. arms control compliance. The United States continues to comply with all of its arms control obligations.

Soviet noncompliance undermines and can negate the security benefits deriving from arms control agreements and could create new security risks. It threatens the confidence essential to an effective arms control process and strengthens doubts about Soviet reliability as a negotiating partner.

The United States is proceeding with serious study of compliance problems, while continuing to press its concerns with the Soviets through diplomatic channels and to insist on explanations, clarifications, and corrective actions. Meanwhile, the United States is continuing to fulfill its own arms control commitments and seeking to negotiate effectively verifiable agreements to reduce armaments and diminish the risk of war.

Conclusion

The firm commitment to equitable, verifiable, and stabilizing arms control agreements by the United States and its allies requires a clear idea of common security needs, of the contribution that arms control can make to those needs, and of the kinds of agreement that can contribute to peace and security. When these elements have been present, the West was able to frame a constructive arms control agenda.

Obviously, equitable and effective arms control agreements are possible only if the Soviet Union is willing to accept such arrangements. The United States and its allies cannot deliver agreements alone. What they can do is to develop well-designed and equitable proposals, explain their rationale, and negotiate seriously.

The process may be long. But the West cannot fall victim either to excessive optimism or unwarranted pessimism. It must show resolve in upholding the requirements for effective arms control and convincing the Soviets that they will not be allowed to maintain or achieve unilateral advantage. The West must evaluate realistically the prospects for agreement, examining the issues at stake, the objectives of the Soviet Union, and its own goals. Only on this basis can the West craft an approach to arms control that will truly enhance the common security and promote international peace.

Eight Challenges for Arms Control

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

The unique element in the U.S.-Soviet relationship is the capability of both countries to destroy each other and much of civilization in the process. Strategic arms negotiations address this central fact of the nuclear age. Between 1969 and 1979, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Although that process yielded some benefits, it failed to meet the hopes generated in the early 1970s. Indeed, in spite of an ongoing arms control process and the exercise of unilateral U.S. restraint, the Soviets have engaged in an unprecedented military buildup over the last 15 years.

The United States and the Soviet Union opened the strategic arms reduction talks (START) in June 1982. The United States proposed deep reductions in ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight that would create a more stable nuclear balance at much lower strategic levels. The Soviet side has proposed reductions in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (missile launchers and bombers) but has not agreed to the substantial cuts in actual warheads that the United States is proposing.

START has been in hiatus since December 1983, when the Soviet Union declined to agree to a resumption date for a sixth round of negotiations. The United States has made clear that it is ready to resume the negotiations at any time without preconditions.

Background

The basic role of U.S. strategic forces is to maintain the peace by deterring attack or preventing intimidation against the United States or its allies. The strategic balance is critical to any calculation by a potential enemy of the costs of aggression against the West.

The strategic balance reflects an assessment of comparative capabilities as well as weapons numbers, command and control facilities, and overall force structure. In considering this balance, it is particularly important to weigh qualitative factors such as a system's survivability and its ability to reach defended targets. A stable deterrent requires diversified strategic forces to guarantee that sufficient numbers of weapons could survive a first strike and retaliate successfully against well-defended targets.

Strategic stability minimizes pressures to use strategic weapons in a crisis and is, therefore, an area of special emphasis by the United States. With their differing capabilities and characteristics, various weapons systems

and force structures can either strengthen or undermine stability. Systems which, when deployed in large numbers, threaten the other side's strategic forces with preemptive destruction and undermine the other side's confidence in its deterrent, are considered destabilizing.

Ballistic missiles—particularly large land-based, multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, given their short flight times, high accuracies, and large yields—can undermine strategic stability if deployed in sufficiently large numbers to create the possibility of a disarming first strike. Bombers, in contrast, have long flight times, which make them inappropriate for a surprise, first-strike attack. Moreover, U.S. bombers face extensive Soviet defenses that are unconstrained by any treaty.

Thus the strategic balance is neither one dimensional nor static. Over the past 15 years, the cumulative effect of various political, military, and technological developments on the overall balance has favored the U.S.S.R. In particular, the increasing capability of Soviet forces to attack and destroy hardened targets (such as missile silos) provides the Soviet Union with a troubling margin of advantage in a critical area of the strategic equation.

Changes in the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Balance

In the mid-1960s, the United States held unquestioned superiority in strategic nuclear forces.

- Although the U.S.S.R. deployed a sizable ICBM force, it was far smaller than the American force of slightly more than 1,000 ICBMs.
- The United States had 656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in 41 nuclear submarines, while the Soviets were only beginning to deploy modern ballistic missile submarines.
- The U.S. strategic bomber force, numbering over 800, was numerically and technologically superior to the Soviet Bison/Bear bomber force.

By 1972—when the SALT I agreements were signed—the Soviet Union had caught up to the United States in several measures of strategic capability and had taken the lead in the number of strategic ballistic missiles (2,000 to 1,700). At the time, however, the U.S. advantage in strategic bombers still provided for rough equality between the two sides in total numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Furthermore, because of its more advanced multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) program, the United States still held a substantial lead in the number of ballistic missile warheads as well as certain qualitative advantages.

The Soviet Union continued its military buildup, however, and instead of accepting strategic parity, today equals or surpasses the United States in most quantitative measures of strategic capability.

- The Soviet Union has about 2,340 ballistic missiles, while the United States has about 1,650.
- The Soviets have not only closed the gap in ballistic missile warheads, but they now actually lead the United States, with about 8,000 strategic ballistic missile warheads to 7,600. Moreover, the Soviets far exceed the United States in the destructive power of their ballistic missiles.
- The U.S. B–52 bomber force has continued to age and to decline in number. The United States, as of September 1984, had about 245 deployed B–52s, which in a conflict would face massive Soviet air defenses unconstrained by any treaty. The Soviets have deployed more than 235 Backfire

bombers, which have inherent intercontinental capability, and more than 160 long-range Bear and Bison bombers.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States decided not to respond to Soviet efforts to attain equality in strategic forces. American strategic thinking had concluded that superiority would be difficult and costly to maintain and, in any case, was not necessary to support a U.S. defense posture based on deterring war. It was believed that strategic parity could provide the basis for a more stable and mutually beneficial East-West relationship.

During the 1970s, therefore, the United States exercised unilateral restraint. Once the MIRV programs for the Poseidon SLBM and Minuteman III ICBM were completed in the first half of the 1970s, the United States slowed or canceled a number of new strategic programs. Construction of the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine was delayed. Development of the MX ICBM was slowed, and the B-1 bomber program was first slowed and then canceled.

Unfortunately, U.S. restraint was not reciprocated by the U.S.S.R. Since 1972, the Soviet Union has deployed 800 new ICBMs involving at least three new ICBM types (the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19, all with MIRV capabilities); four new SLBMs (the SS-N-8, SS-N-17, SS-N-18, and SS-N-20); three Delta-class ballistic missile submarine types; the new large Typhoon ballistic missile submarine; and over 235 new Backfire bombers. The Soviets also have begun producing a new variant of the Bear bomber designed to carry cruise missiles.

By any objective measure, the Soviet Union achieved rough equality with the United States in strategic nuclear forces in the early to mid-1970s. The Soviet buildup, however, continued unabated. Today their testing and development programs for new classes of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers) are moving forward with no evidence of diminished momentum. Thus the U.S.S.R. now has in various stages of testing and development two new ICBMs (SS-X-24 and SS-X-25), a new SLBM (SS-NX-23), long-range ground-, sea-, and air-launched cruise missiles, and the Blackjack strategic bomber. This massive, unrelenting buildup goes beyond any reasonable defense needs and raises serious questions about Soviet intentions.

The Failed Promise of SALT

In October 1969, in an effort to bring the strategic arms competition under some measure of control, the United States and the Soviet Union began the 2½-year series of strategic arms limitation talks known as SALT I.

After initial attempts to achieve a comprehensive agreement led to stalemate, the two sides agreed to concentrate on a treaty of indefinite duration limiting defensive antiballistic missile systems and a 5-year interim agreement establishing certaining limits on strategic offensive weapons.

At their summit meeting in Moscow on May 26, 1972, President Nixon and then Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev signed two agreements. The U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty set precise limits on the deployment of ABM systems, allowing each side two sites with 100 ABM missile launchers each (subsequently modified in 1974 to allow each side only one ABM site). The Interim Agreement limited each side essentially to the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers it then possessed or had "under construction," while permitting

an increase in SLBM launchers if a corresponding number of older ICBM launchers were dismantled.

SALT I, however, was intended only as a stopgap providing for some restraints until a more comprehensive agreement could be reached and deferring many difficult questions to later negotiation. SALT II, an effort to attain a longer term comprehensive treaty, began in late 1972. In November 1974, at the Vladivostok meeting between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev, both sides agreed to a basic framework for a future agreement. This accord established equal aggregate limits on the overall numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (missile launchers and bombers) allowed each side. After Vladivostok, however, important issues remained to be settled, including how to handle emerging systems such as the cruise missile and the Backfire bomber.

In May 1977, shortly after the Carter Administration assumed office, the United States offered a new proposal calling for deep reductions in the numbers agreed at Vladivostok. The Soviets quickly rejected this proposal. Subsequent negotiations returned to the Vladivostok formula and eventually led to agreement on a general framework for SALT II, including:

- A treaty entailing equal aggregate ceilings on various categories of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles as well as some constraints on development and construction;
- A 3-year protocol with some temporary constraints on mobile ICBMs and cruise missiles; and
- A joint statement of principles for further negotiations.

This agreement was signed by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev in Vienna in June 1979. It included a number of specific limits but little in the way of genuine reductions. Although the agreement did call for some reductions in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, ballistic missile warhead and throw-weight levels were allowed to rise:

- Each side would be allowed a combined total of 2,400 (2,250 after 1981) ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers.
- Each side accepted equal sublimits on launchers equipped with MIRVed ICBMs; on launchers equipped with MIRVed ballistic missiles; and on launchers equipped with MIRVed ballistic missiles plus bombers armed with cruise missiles.
- Each side agreed to various constraints on modernization.

Senate consideration of SALT II was deferred indefinitely following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. In the national debate preceding that event, considerable doubts were raised within the Senate and elsewhere about the degree to which the agreement could serve as an effective arms control measure, whether it could be effectively verified and whether it adequately addressed U.S. and Western security needs.

Although the SALT process brought certain benefits in the SALT I agreements, its final result as embodied in SALT II was a clear disappointment to the hopes generated in the early 1970s. The basic faults of SALT II were that it would have permitted substantial growth in the strategic forces of both sides, was unbalanced in its impact, and was inadequately verifiable in several provisions.

Evidence of the inadequacy of the SALT process lay in the fact that during the period of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, and in spite of the unilateral restraint demonstrated by the United States, the U.S.S.R. continued its massive strategic buildup. As a result, the adverse changes in the strategic balance accelerated. Far from inhibiting these developments, SALT II tended to codify the asymmetries. Thus:

- Limitations were applied to launchers but not to the growing number of warheads, a more meaningful unit of account;
- The Soviet Union was granted a unilateral right to deploy more than 300 heavy ICBMs; and
- The Soviet Backfire was not counted under the strategic delivery vehicle aggregate despite its intercontinental capabilities.

A New Beginning: The U.S. START Approach

When the Reagan Administration took office in January 1981, it undertook an in-depth review of U.S. security and arms control policies. President Reagan concluded that because of SALT II's inadequacies, it would be inappropriate to seek ratification. Renegotiation of SALT II was considered, but the President decided that it would be better to seek significant reductions in the existing numbers of strategic forces rather than simply to make another attempt to limit further growth.

To this end, the United States proposed the strategic arms reduction talks or START. At the same time, in order to create a positive atmosphere for START and to build upon the SALT process, the United States affirmed that it would take no action to undercut existing agreements, including the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II agreement, provided the Soviets exercised comparable restraint. The Soviets have made statements reflecting a similar policy.

The START negotiations began in Geneva in the summer of 1982. The basic U.S. objective has been an agreement that would enhance stability and achieve major reductions in the level of strategic nuclear weaponry on both sides. This would be the first agreement of its kind in the postwar era.

In emphasizing significant reductions, the United States seeks an agreement that not only reduces the burden of armaments but, more importantly, reduces the risk of war. Given differing characteristics, certain types of strategic weapons can be more destabilizing than others. For this reason, the President decided initially to emphasize reducing ballistic missiles, particularly large ICBMs. In announcing the U.S. position in May 1982, the President made clear that nothing was excluded from the negotiations and that the United States would consider any serious Soviet proposal.

The U.S. approach to START reflects the judgment that the approach taken in SALT—limits focused primarily on the number of strategic delivery vehicles—failed to ensure real reductions in strategic forces or to redress dangerous asymmetries in the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. Thus the U.S. START approach has adopted a broader set of units of limitation, including direct constraints on the number of ballistic missile warheads, along with efforts to reduce the destructive potential of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. Central features of the U.S. proposals introduced in June 1982 include:

- Reductions in the number of ballistic missile warheads by about one-third, to a level of 5,000 for each side;

- Additional restrictions to ensure substantial cuts in the most destabilizing categories of ballistic missile systems;
- Substantial reductions in ballistic missile destructive capability and potential (throw-weight);
- An equal ceiling on heavy bombers below the U.S. level in SALT II; and
- Equitable limits and constraints on other strategic systems, including limits on the number of cruise missiles that could be carried by bombers.

The Scowcroft Commission Report: Forging a New Consensus

In January 1983, President Reagan established the Special Commission on Strategic Forces to review the U.S. strategic modernization program, particularly the future of the land-based ICBM deterrent, and to provide specific recommendations for greater strategic stability. The commission, popularly known as the Scowcroft commission after its chairman, retired General Brent Scowcroft, delivered its report on April 6, 1983; President Reagan endorsed the commission's recommendations and sent the report to Congress on April 12, 1983. The commission submitted a final report to the President on March 21, 1984, in which it reiterated its previous recommendations.

The April 1983 report, which provided the basis for a revitalized bipartisan consensus on American strategic security policy, made three basic recommendations:

First, it urged continued improvements in U.S. command, control, and communications, and continuation of the U.S. bomber, submarine, and cruise missile programs.

Second, it urged modernization of U.S. ICBM forces, including deployment of 100 new MX/Peacekeeper missiles, and initiation of developmental work on a small, single-warhead ICBM that could be ready for deployment in the early 1990s.

Third, the commission recommended major research efforts in strategic defense and on ways to increase the survivability of U.S. land-based forces.

Equally important, the report underscored the need for negotiations leading to balanced arms control agreements that would promote stability in times of crisis and result in meaningful, verifiable reductions. The commission noted that, in time, the United States should try to promote an evolution toward forces in which each side would be "encouraged to see to the survivability of its own forces in a way that does not threaten the other." The commission said that its approach toward arms control was compatible with the basic objectives and direction of the Reagan Administration's policies.

President Reagan, in endorsing the commission's report, said that the modernization effort recommended by the report "would provide clear evidence to the Soviet Union that it is in their best interest to negotiate with us in good faith and with seriousness of purpose." The President called on Congress to join him in supporting the bipartisan program set forth by the commission "to pursue arms control agreements that promote stability, to meet the needs of our ICBM force today, and to move to a more stable ICBM structure in the future."

New U.S. START Initiatives

In line with the Scowcroft commission recommendations, the United States began research and development on a new small, single-warhead ICBM and in June 1983 related its original proposal in START for limits of 850 on the numbers of ballistic missile launchers. While the central elements of the U.S. START proposal remained unchanged, the United States made additional important revisions to its position which took into consideration several Soviet concerns about the original U.S. proposal. The United States presented a draft treaty in the START negotiations on July 7, 1983, which incorporated the U.S. START position.

In a further important initiative, taken after close consultation with the Congress, President Reagan in October 1983 added to the U.S. START position the principle of mutual, guaranteed, build-down of strategic forces. The build-down proposal is designed to channel modernization of strategic forces toward more stabilizing systems and to ensure regular annual reductions of strategic ballistic missile warheads and heavy bombers. At the same time, President Reagan expressed U.S. willingness to explore with the Soviets possible trade-offs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage and interest.

U.S. START Proposals:

- Mutual, guaranteed build-down of ballistic missile warheads and bomber platforms.
- 5,000 ballistic missile warhead limit.
- Significant reductions in deployed ballistic missiles.
- Reduction in current disparity in ballistic missile destructive capacity and potential.
- Bomber and ALCM limits below SALT II.

Advantages:

- Reduce strategic ballistic missile warheads by one-third for each side.
- Encourage a more stable nuclear balance at lower force levels.
- Permit necessary and stabilizing modernization.
- Establish the basis for further reductions.

The Soviet START Proposal

In many respects the Soviet response was disappointing, but progress had been made before the Soviet suspension of the talks in December 1983. The Soviet START proposal has some positive elements, for example, proposed reductions in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles below SALT II levels. However, the Soviet proposal does not provide an adequate basis for the kind of far-reaching, stabilizing, and equitable agreement the United States seeks:

- The Soviet proposal retains most of the basic faults of SALT II. Under the Soviet proposal, the United States and the U.S.S.R. each would be allowed an aggregate of 1,800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers). The Soviets also have proposed a combined limit on

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Errata for p. 33 of "Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace"

The following chart revises and updates the original version:

U.S. START Proposal and the Strategic Balance, Fall 1984



¹The original START proposal was to reduce the total level of deployed ballistic missiles for each side to 850. However, in response to Soviet concerns, in June 1983 the United States indicated that it would be flexible about the level of deployed ballistic missiles.

²Figures are for actual or deployed ballistic missile warheads. Under SALT counting rules, the numbers would be somewhat higher.

³The U.S. figure includes 263 currently operational B–52s. The remainder are in storage, museums, ground training, etc., but are charged to the U.S. account under SALT counting rules.

The U.S.S.R. figure includes Bear, Bison and Backfire bombers.

⁴Under the U.S. START proposal, the 3 to 1 disparity in throw-weight (in the Soviets' favor) would be substantially reduced.

nuclear charges (by which they mean missile warheads and bomber weapons). In addition, they propose to ban all ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and limit air-launched cruise missiles, with a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

- The Soviet START proposal does not provide for genuine reductions in the two countries' forces. It would reduce *strategic delivery vehicles* by 25% from the high level of 2,400 that would have been established by SALT II, but it would permit substantial growth in the number of *ballistic missile warheads* above current levels.
- In addition, the Soviet proposal does not link reductions to increased strategic stability. It does not distinguish between fast, accurate, MIRVed ballistic missiles and slow-flying systems such as bombers that face unconstrained Soviet defenses.

During negotiations in the fall of 1983, the Soviet Union did not discuss seriously the U.S. build-down proposal nor did it respond to the U.S. offer to explore tradeoffs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage and interest. The Soviets have publicly leveled several criticisms at the U.S. approach to START.

The Soviets charge that the U.S. proposal's focus on MIRVed ICBMs "discriminates" against the Soviet Union, which has a higher proportion of its nuclear warheads on MIRVed ICBMs. In fact, however, since rough equality now exists in the number of ballistic missile warheads, the U.S. proposal would force both countries to make approximately equal reductions in this area. Although the Soviet Union would have to make proportionally greater reductions in its land-based ICBM systems, because a larger proportion of their warheads are on them, the United States would have to make relatively greater reductions in warheads on SLBMs.

The Soviets also charge that the U.S. proposal would force them to restructure their strategic forces. Although the U.S. proposal does favor a shift away from land-based MIRVed ICBMs, such a shift would be in the interest of both countries because it would diminish the incentive and the ability to launch a crippling first strike.

START and NATO

The United States has kept its allies fully informed of its arms control approach and of the U.S. and Soviet START positions. The U.S. proposal was endorsed by the leaders of NATO governments at the June 1982 NATO summit in Bonn and since then has been repeatedly endorsed by NATO ministers.

The process of alliance consultations is traditional and vital. The START reductions the United States seeks would enhance the security of other Western nations as well as that of the United States. Since the opening of the talks in June 1982, the President's START negotiator has met periodically with the NATO ambassadors and briefed them on the course of the talks, a practice that will continue.

Conclusion

At the end of Round V of START in December 1983, the Soviet Union—claiming "a change in the strategic situation" due to the initiation of limited

NATO missile deployments in Europe under the alliance's 1979 decision—refused to set a resumption date for the talks.

START touches upon issues central to both U.S. and Soviet national security interests. The United States is committed to fair and balanced arms control and has made a good faith proposal, demonstrating considerable flexibility while remaining open to serious Soviet proposals. The United States is convinced that implementation of its START proposals would enhance not only U.S. and allied security but that of the Soviet Union as well and is prepared to resume the negotiations any time and any place.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

The INF negotiations began in Geneva in November 1981; the Soviet Union unilaterally broke off the talks in November 1983. The talks centered on the intermediate-range nuclear systems of greatest concern to the two sides—land-based, longer range INF missiles. The United States proposed the elimination of this entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles or, as an interim agreement, substantial reductions to equal global levels for both sides of warheads on such missiles. In contrast, the Soviets have insisted on keeping their monopoly in LRINF missiles vis-a-vis the United States. Their approach suggests that they place much greater importance on the political goal of trying to split NATO than on addressing real security concerns.

Background

U.S. short- and intermediate-range nuclear systems in Europe are essential to deterrence. These systems link NATO's conventional forces and the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent. They "couple" the United States to Western Europe and ensure that the entire spectrum of U.S. power is available to deter any potential aggressor.

The Soviet Union has long deployed missiles on its territory with sufficient range to strike targets in Europe but not the United States. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S.S.R. deployed SS–4 and SS–5 missiles targeted against Europe. Some 575 were in place by mid-1977. In contrast, the United States, in the early 1960s, deployed fewer numbers of roughly equivalent missiles—the Thor and Jupiter—in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey. The United States unilaterally withdrew and retired these systems in the 1960s.

Thus, from the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union held a monopoly over the United States in this type of missile. The Soviet lead was tolerable in an era when the imbalance in these intermediate-range systems was offset by superior U.S. strategic forces, which provided an adequate deterrent to Soviet aggression or intimidation.

Two critical developments—Soviet achievement of strategic parity with the United States and deployment of the SS–20—came together in the 1970s to alter the situation.

The SS–20 Buildup. As part of an unprecedented peacetime military buildup, the Soviet Union began strengthening its intermediate-range nuclear forces—an area in which it already was clearly superior to NATO—with the deployment in 1977 of the highly capable SS–20.

- The SS-20 is more accurate and has a greater range than the SS-4 and SS-5. From its bases on Soviet territory, it can strike targets throughout Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and much of Asia and the Pacific.
- The SS-20's mobility and transportability allow it to be redeployed quickly to any part of the U.S.S.R.
- The SS-20 carries three independently targetable warheads, as opposed to the single warhead of the earlier missiles, and its launchers are capable of firing two, three, or more rounds of missiles.

The SS-20 has substantially improved the Soviet LRINF missile force both qualitatively and quantitatively. Soviet deployment of these missiles (at the rate of about one per week) continued throughout the INF talks, even after the Soviet declaration in 1982 of a "unilateral moratorium" on new missiles in or within range of Europe, and it shows no sign of stopping. As of September 1984, the Soviets had deployed 378 SS-20 missiles with 1,134 warheads (not counting refires), as well as about 200 SS-4 missiles. Even though the obsolete SS-5s had been phased out, the Soviets still have *increased* the total number of warheads deployed on LRINF missile launchers to some 1,300.

By the late 1970s, the Soviet Union had attained parity with the United States in strategic nuclear forces, dramatically increased its lead in INF, and retained its conventional force advantages. Strategists and political leaders in Europe and America were concerned that these trends, if unchecked, might lead Soviet leaders to conclude, however mistakenly, that the evolving military balance made aggression feasible or intimidation worthwhile. The U.S. commitment to the defense of its allies had not changed, but it was feared the Soviet Union might perceive the linkage between European and North American security as less credible. Such a perception would undermine deterrence and threaten the peace.

European concerns were exacerbated by the SALT II process, which many believed did not take adequate account of European security interests. Specifically, the SS-20 was not limited by the SALT II agreement, yet cruise missiles, which offered a potential for countering Soviet SS-20 deployments against Europe, would have been constrained, at least temporarily.

The December 1979 "Dual-Track" Decision

These concerns—first expressed by European members of NATO—led to intensive alliance-wide consultations, culminating in the "dual-track" decision of 1979. On the modernization track, the alliance decided to redress the INF imbalance through deployment in Western Europe, starting in 1983, of 572 single-warhead U.S. LRINF missiles—108 Pershing II ballistic missiles, as a replacement for the shorter range Pershing I, and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). Deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs began in December 1983 in accordance with the schedule agreed to by NATO.

The second element of the 1979 decision was the arms control track, calling for U.S.-Soviet negotiations on INF. The alliance agreed that such talks should proceed step-by-step toward comprehensive limitations. It was, therefore, decided that the talks should focus ini-

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Advantages of NATO INF Proposals:

- Eliminate entire class of U.S. and Soviet longer range INF missiles or reduce them to equal force levels.
- Constrain shorter range INF missiles capable of substituting for the class of missiles to be eliminated or reduced.
- Establish the basis for further reductions.
- Strengthen deterrence of war.

tially on LRINF missiles, the systems of greatest concern to both sides—the Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 and the U.S. Pershing II and GLCM.

The dual-track decision also established criteria for INF arms control that were further developed by NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG), the alliance forum for consultations on INF arms control. While in some cases these criteria are unique to the INF negotiations, they derive from and are fully consistent with the basic principles that the United States believes essential for sound arms control:

There must be equality of rights and limits. The principle of equality, by ruling out unilateral advantage, is fundamental to sound arms control, stability, and a U.S.-Soviet relationship based on reciprocity and mutual restraint.

The negotiations should encompass U.S. and Soviet systems only. In bilateral negotiations, it would be inappropriate to negotiate limits on, or discuss compensation for, the independent nuclear forces of any other country.

Limitations must be applied globally, with no transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia. Because of the range, mobility, and transportability of modern Soviet LRINF missile systems, regional limits alone would be insufficient. Soviet SS-20s based in Central Asia can strike most targets in the European NATO countries. Those missiles based farther east also could be moved readily to locations from which they could strike Europe as well. An agreement covering only missiles in Europe, therefore, could easily be undermined and would not be militarily meaningful, either to America's European allies or to those in Asia.

There must be no adverse effect on NATO's conventional defense and deterrent capability. NATO could not accept Soviet demands to eliminate from Europe virtually all U.S. aircraft with important conventional missions.

Any agreement must be effectively verifiable.

From Decision to Negotiations (1980–81)

In accordance with the dual-track decision, the United States immediately offered to begin negotiations with the U.S.S.R. The Soviets initially refused, posing the condition that NATO must first renounce the modernization track. The Soviets countered with a proposal for a bilateral "moratorium" on deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. NATO rejected this offer for three reasons:

- A moratorium would have codified the Soviet advantage in INF, particularly its monopoly of LRINF missiles, and thus preserved the imbalance the 1979 decision had set out to redress;

Target Coverage of Soviet SS-20 and NATO Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles

▲ SS-20 location
● ICBM location

- It would not have halted the SS-20 buildup in the eastern U.S.S.R.; and
- By preventing NATO's deployment, a moratorium would have removed the very incentive the Soviets had to negotiate genuine reductions.

Prospects for talks thus remained stalemated through the first half of 1980. Only after Moscow recognized, in the summer of that year, that NATO was determined to proceed with deployments, did the Soviets agree to negotiations. A month of preliminary exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union took place in Geneva in the fall of 1980.

When President Reagan assumed office in January 1981, he ordered a comprehensive review of U.S. security and arms control policies. In March of that year, the Administration reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to pursue both tracks of the 1979 decision—arms control as well as modernization.

At the May 1981 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Rome, it was announced that the United States would open INF negotiations with the Soviet Union in the fall. That summer, contacts between U.S. and Soviet officials took place regarding the arrangements.

At the same time, NATO's Special Consultative Group began intensive deliberations on the specifics of the U.S. negotiating position. The SCG continued to meet while the talks were going on and has done so regularly since the Soviet walkout. A second NATO body, the High Level Group of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, also met to address questions raised by the prospective deployment of U.S. LRINF missiles.

Taken as a whole, these activities represent the most intensive intra-alliance consultations in NATO's history. They have ensured that the U.S. negotiating position fully reflects allied views and that the implementation of both tracks of the 1979 decision proceeds on the basis of full coordination among the allies. A comprehensive account of the INF talks is available in the SCG's "Progress Report to Ministers" of December 8, 1983.

First Year of Negotiations

Ambassador Paul Nitze, the U.S. INF negotiator, first met with his Soviet counterpart, Ambassador Yuli Kvitsinskiy, in Geneva on November 30, 1981.

Zero Option. At the beginning of the talks, President Reagan set forth the "zero/zero" option—an offer to forego deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM if the Soviet Union would eliminate its SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. The "zero option" would eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons—longer range INF missiles. That remains the long-term U.S. objective. At the same time, the United States emphasized that it would negotiate in good faith and consider any serious Soviet proposal.

Soviet Position. The Soviet Union proposed that "NATO"—by which the Soviets meant the United States, United Kingdom, and France—and the U.S.S.R. each reduce to 300 "medium-range" missiles and aircraft in or "intended for use" in Europe. The Soviet proposal, while permitting the U.S.S.R. to retain a substantial number of SS-20s in Europe and to continue its buildup of SS-20s in Asia, would have prohibited deployment of any U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe. It also would have removed from Europe hundreds of U.S. aircraft capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional weapons, essential to NATO's conventional deterrent.

Central Issues. As the negotiations progressed during 1982, several areas of disagreement between the two sides emerged:

LRINF Missiles. While the United States proposed the reciprocal elimination of all U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles, the Soviet proposal would have legitimized a Soviet monopoly in these systems.

The Balance. The Soviets based their position on the assertion that a "balance" in "medium-range" forces in Europe already existed, a claim resting on a selective use of data. In fact, the Soviet Union holds an advantage in every category of INF systems. The Soviets include in their "balance" independent British and French systems and U.S. aircraft not located in Europe. They ignore missiles in the eastern U.S.S.R. that can strike NATO targets and exclude thousands of their own nuclear-capable aircraft with characteristics similar to those of the U.S. aircraft they do include.

The Soviets first claimed that there was a balance in October 1979, when there were 100 SS–20s. They repeated this claim while they continued to deploy such missiles and NATO deployed nothing: in 1981, when there were 250 SS–20s, and early 1983, when 351 were in place, while NATO still had not deployed a single missile.

Geographic Scope. The United States wants global limits on LRINF missiles because of their range, mobility, and transportability. The Soviets have proposed binding limits only on those systems in or "intended for use in" Europe, leaving the ever-increasing systems in the eastern U.S.S.R. outside the terms of an agreement. Soviet missiles in the eastern U.S.S.R. pose a growing threat to U.S. friends and allies in Asia. Many such missile systems are still within range of NATO Europe, while all could be redeployed quickly to be within such range.

Aircraft. The original one-sided Soviet proposal to limit certain Western aircraft while excluding similar Soviet/Warsaw Pact aircraft was designed to undermine the alliance's conventional defense and deterrent capabilities, while leaving untouched a large number of Soviet nuclear-capable aircraft. The United States was concerned that introducing aircraft into the talks could delay agreement on LRINF missiles. Nevertheless, there was some progress in the aircraft issue in late 1983.

U.S. and Soviet Longer Range INF Missiles
How the LRINF Imbalance Developed and Soviet Claims That a Balance Exists



'Includes warheads on Soviet SS-20s and older SS-4s and SS-5s, but does not include warheads on refire missiles.

Third-Country Forces. The Soviets have sought to "take into account" the independent forces of the United Kingdom and France. NATO made clear from the outset that the INF negotiations should encompass limits only on U.S. and Soviet systems. If Soviet SS–20s are to be retained, only U.S. LRINF missiles can offset them and ensure the necessary link between American strategic power and European security. Moreover:

- Britain and France are sovereign countries, each with its own strategic security interests. The United States does not determine the composition or control the use of these independent forces.
- British and French forces represent minimum national deterrents, designed to deter attack against Britain and France, not against the other 13 non-nuclear members of NATO.
- British and French forces are different in role and characteristics from the U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles.
- British and French forces are small compared to the size of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Even if all Soviet LRINF missiles were removed from consideration, the Soviet Union would still have thousands of INF aircraft and other nuclear systems (including substantial strategic nuclear forces) arrayed against Britain, France, and the other West European NATO allies.
- In essence, the Soviets demand that the U.S.S.R. be granted a legally sanctioned "right" to have nuclear forces equal to those of all other powers combined. This is tantamount to a demand to legitimize global Soviet military superiority and political domination.
- The Soviets sought compensation for U.K. and French forces in SALT I and SALT II. Like those talks, the INF negotiations are bilateral, and neither Britain nor France would permit its forces to be included. In SALT, it should be noted, the Soviets accepted agreements applying limits only to U.S. and Soviet systems.

The "Walk-in-the-Woods". In summer 1982, Ambassadors Nitze and Kvitsinskiy developed an informal package of proposals for consideration by their respective capitals. That package provided for equal levels of LRINF missile launchers in Europe (the United States to be allowed 75 GLCM launchers and 300 warheads, the Soviets 75 SS–20 launchers with 225 warheads), no Pershing II deployment, and a freeze on SS–20s in the Eastern U.S.S.R. The package did not compensate the Soviets for U.K. and French forces. Although Washington had some problems with the package, Ambassador Nitze was authorized to pursue informal discussions. But Moscow rejected the entire package as well as further informal explorations.

Second Year of Negotiations

Interim Agreement Proposal. Following extensive discussions within the alliance and between the United States and Japan, on March 30, 1983, President Reagan announced a new proposal: scaling back NATO's planned deployments to as low a level as the Soviet Union would accept, provided that the U.S.S.R. reduced its own LRINF deployments to an equal global level of warheads. In advancing this proposal for an interim agreement, President Reagan reaffirmed that the zero/zero outcome remained NATO's long-term objective.

The Soviets rejected the interim agreement proposal even before they had a chance to study it. They also failed to consider a U.S. offer to discuss collateral constraints following a U.S. pro-

posal that summer to make reciprocal such constraints on shorter range INF systems. However, in August 1983, then Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov for the first time indicated Soviet willingness to destroy SS-20s removed from Europe as part of an agreement, rather than reserving the right to redeploy them, as had been their position theretofore.

U.S. September Initiatives. On September 22, 1983, the United States introduced three new proposals responding directly to what the Soviet Union had described as important concerns:

- Within the context of an agreement providing the right to equal global levels of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile warheads, the United States was prepared to consider a commitment not to offset the entire worldwide Soviet LRINF missile deployments by deployments in Europe, while retaining the right to such deployments elsewhere;
- The United States was prepared to apportion reductions under an agreement between Pershing IIs and GLCMs in an appropriate manner; and
- The United States was prepared to consider equal limits on specific types of U.S. and Soviet land-based LRINF aircraft.

As President Reagan stated at the UN General Assembly in September 1983, with these initiatives "the door to an agreement is open." Nonetheless, the Soviets refused to explore the U.S. suggestion. They said they could not discuss the geographic allocation or Pershing II reduction proposals, since these presupposed there would be some U.S. deployments. (Throughout the negotiations, in fact, the Soviets insisted that not a single U.S. cruise or Pershing II missile could be deployed.) They also declined serious discussion of the U.S. aircraft proposal.

Soviet Walkout. On October 26, 1983, Andropov announced a somewhat modified Soviet position, while threatening to end the talks when NATO deployments began. He said that the Soviets would reduce their SS-20s in or within range of Europe to about 140, with 420 warheads, to match British and French missiles. SS-20 deployments in the eastern U.S.S.R. would be frozen following entry into force of an agreement concerning missiles in the European area, as long as there was no change in the "strategic situation" in Asia. Andropov also suggested some flexibility on the aircraft issue. In November, the United States proposed agreeing to an equal global ceiling of 420 LRINF missile warheads, corresponding to Andropov's October number for Soviet warheads in Europe.

On November 23, 1983, the Soviets walked out of the talks, citing recent parliamentary votes in Great Britain, Italy, and Germany reaffirming NATO's dual-track decision and the arrival of U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe. The Soviets, whose LRINF deployments had continued throughout 2 years of negotiations, argued that NATO's long-planned deployments created an "obstacle" to talks. NATO expressed its regret at the Soviet decision and called on the Soviets to return to the table. The United States remains ready to resume INF negotiations at once, without preconditions.

Reductions in NATO's Nuclear Stockpile

The 1979 decision explicitly stated that INF modernization would not increase NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. One element of the decision was to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from the NATO stockpile in Europe. This with-

drawal was completed in 1980. Moreover, the decision stipulated that one additional nuclear warhead would be withdrawn for each new LRINF missile deployed.

The High Level Group then undertook an extensive study of NATO's security needs, the results of which were presented to NATO defense ministers at the October 1983 meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group. At the meeting, the ministers announced that, on the basis of the study, NATO would withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Europe.

When these actions are completed, NATO will have withdrawn at least five nuclear warheads for each LRINF missile deployed, and the total NATO nuclear stockpile will be at its lowest level in over 20 years.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

The negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) began in Vienna in 1973. These talks result from a NATO initiative to reduce the unequal levels of Eastern and Western military manpower in Central Europe to equal but significantly lower levels. The negotiations are part of broader efforts by the United States and its allies to reduce the likelihood of conflict in Central Europe and to strengthen East-West stability. Although the Warsaw Pact nominally accepts this goal, Eastern unwillingness thus far to address its present manpower superiority, or to accept adequate measures to ensure compliance with an MBFR agreement, remains the main obstacle to progress. The West continues to seek ways to advance the negotiations.

The Origins of MBFR

Central Europe is the scene of the most massive concentration of conventional military power in the world: the ground forces of East and West in this area total some 1.75 million men. These forces constitute a burden on both sides that is in their mutual interest to reduce. Eastern superiority of some 170,000 ground force personnel in this region is an element of instability in the East-West balance. Reductions to equal levels of conventional forces would do much to strengthen political and economic stability and to decrease the burden of maintaining such large numbers of troops.

NATO's attempt through negotiations to reduce these troop levels began in 1967, with the adoption of the Harmel report on "The Future Tasks of the Alliance." This report declared that relations with the Soviet Union should be based on a strong defense and deterrent capability as well as a readiness for dialogue and detente. The report examined the prospects for force reductions in Central Europe and concluded that as long as balanced reductions in Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe could be obtained, NATO could safely make limited cuts in its own conventional strength there.

At their June 1968 ministerial meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland, the NATO allies expressed interest in "a process leading to mutual force reductions" in Europe. "Balanced and mutual force reductions," the declaration stated, "can contribute significantly to the lessening of tension and to further reducing the danger of war." (France, which is not a member of NATO's integrated military structure, did not participate in this initiative or in the subsequent MBFR negotiations.)

Negotiations were delayed, however, by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. In August 1968, just

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2 months after the Reykjavik meeting, 32 Warsaw Pact divisions invaded Czechoslovakia. Five Soviet divisions remained permanently when the other forces departed. By increasing the number of Soviet divisions in Central Europe from 22 to 27—an addition of some 70,000 Soviet soldiers—the invasion made an agreement establishing force parity harder to achieve.

At their Rome ministerial on May 27, 1970, the NATO allies renewed their offer to the Warsaw Pact. For 2 years, however, the Soviet Union insisted that the "reduction of foreign troops" could be considered only in the context of its own proposal for a European security conference. In May 1972, Soviet leader Brezhnev finally dropped this condition and agreed to begin exploratory negotiations. (The Soviet proposal for a security conference eventually evolved into the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which convened at Helsinki in 1973.) That month, at the signing of the Interim Agreement on strategic arms limitation (SALT I), Brezhnev and President Nixon endorsed "the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe through reciprocal reduction of forces."

Representatives of 12 members of NATO and the 7 Warsaw Pact members met on January 31, 1973, to determine the terms of reference for the negotiations. The first MBFR negotiating round began on October 30 of that year.

The Nature of the MBFR Talks

The MBFR negotiations are the longest continuous multilateral arms control talks in history. They were 5 years in gestation and have been going on for 11 more. The goal is to reduce each side's military manpower in the Central European "zone of reductions" to parity at a level of 700,000 ground force personnel and a maximum of 900,000 air and ground force personnel combined. The zone of reductions consists of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries on the Western side, and East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on the Eastern. In addition to these reductions, the West seeks certain "associated measures" that would enhance stability and facilitate verification. These measures would give each side confidence that the other is observing the agreed manpower limits and is not assuming a threatening posture with residual forces.

Beyond the highly technical issues that have characterized the MBFR negotiations from the beginning is the more fundamental question of whether the Soviet Union is prepared to accept a verifiable agreement guaranteeing East-West manpower equality in the zone of reductions. Despite stated Soviet acceptance of the principle of parity, the Soviet Union has steadfastly resisted agreement on the data relating to its force levels. This has raised serious questions about Soviet willingness to accept genuine and verifiable reductions to equal levels.

Geographical Asymmetry and Force Disparity

Fundamental to the question of the conventional force balance in Central Europe is the geographical asymmetry between the United States and the U.S.S.R., which works to the advantage of the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet Union's western border is only 360–420 miles from the eastern border of the Federal Republic of Germany. In the West, however, the Atlantic Ocean lies between the United States and the European allies. In the event of

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severe tension or actual conflict, the Soviet Union, drawing on its vast manpower reserves, could quickly move forces forward over an excellent railway and paved road network. To reinforce NATO, the United States would have to transport troops by sea and air from bases over 3,500 miles away and would have to overcome serious logistical problems.

Western Europe's geographical compactness makes defense in depth difficult and undesirable; one-quarter of West Germany's industrial production and 30% of its population are less than 60 miles from the NATO-Warsaw Pact border.

The geographical realities of Western Europe and NATO's commitment to preserve the territorial integrity of its members make imperative a policy of "forward defense," but the distance separating Europe from the United States complicates the implementation of such a policy. The Soviet Union and its allies have used these geographic disparities to gain substantial military advantage.

Western Objectives in MBFR

NATO draws its strength from the fact that it is a coalition of free nations, joined together to ensure their common security. The Western position is based on consensus, arrived at in NATO headquarters in Brussels and transmitted to the allied negotiators in Vienna.

NATO is a defensive alliance not merely in declared policy but in its military posture and, most importantly, in the minds of its people and their leaders. What NATO seeks at Vienna is greater security from aggression and, by extension, a lessening of the risk of war

for all of Europe. The keystone of this effort is the search for parity; the West has never sought in MBFR to alter the European conventional balance to achieve superiority over the Warsaw Pact.

The geographic, military, and political disparities between the two alliances have led NATO to set certain standards for an MBFR agreement.

Parity. The current force disparity threatens stability, poses a significant threat to NATO security, and potentially lowers the nuclear threshold. The MBFR negotiations are intended to eliminate this disparity at least in the Central European reductions area.

Reductions. In view of present inequality, parity can be achieved only through asymmetrical reductions, i.e., with the East reducing more than the West. But the West also seeks parity at a lower level and would thus make sizable reductions of its own.

Associated Measures. To be effective, arms reductions agreements must contain provisions to ensure and verify compliance and to inhibit assumption of a threatening posture by the forces still left in the area. The Western package of associated measures would serve these objectives.

The Course of the Negotiations: Eastern and Western Positions

In MBFR's 11-year existence, both East and West have made a variety of proposals. On both sides, however, there has been a strong continuity in objectives.

The West has consistently sought parity of forces at a reduced level. The East, with equal consistency, has resisted effective acceptance of parity. Initially, it rejected equality explicitly; later, it did so implicitly, accepting parity as a goal but refusing to admit to the size of its current forces and, consequently, to the size of reductions that would be needed to achieve parity.

On November 8, 1973, the East submitted a draft agreement calling for overall reductions of about 17% for ground and air forces on both sides. The reductions were to take place in three consecutive phases; each side was to withdraw 20,000 forces, and those not indigenous to the area of reductions would be withdrawn to their national territories. The equal reductions called for by the East would have perpetuated the force disparity already existing in the East's favor.

On November 22, 1973, the West presented its proposal, calling for reductions in two phases to an equal level on both sides. The first phase would be limited to U.S. and Soviet personnel, involving 29,000 U.S. and 68,000 Soviet troops and withdrawal of 1,700 Soviet tanks. The Soviet reduction was to entail withdrawal of a complete Soviet tank army, representing the most threatening offensive force in the area. In the second phase, reductions would continue on both sides until a common ceiling of 700,000 ground forces and 900,000 ground and air forces combined was reached.

By 1975 it was clear that the East was not prepared to accept the Western proposal. Following the December 1975 NATO ministerial, the West sought to give new impetus to the talks. In exchange for Eastern agreement to the basic principle of the Western proposal (two-phase asymmetrical reductions to parity, including withdrawal of a five-division Soviet tank army in the first

phase), NATO offered to withdraw 54 nuclear-capable F-4 aircraft and 36 Pershing I missiles, together with 1,000 nuclear warheads.

The East again failed to agree.[1] It followed this Western move by introducing a new MBFR proposal in February 1976. Withdrawals were expressed solely in percentage terms; forces would be withdrawn in regiments and brigades; and—picking up the idea of including nuclear forces—each side would withdraw 54 nuclear-capable aircraft and ballistic missile systems. The latter offer ignored the Western call for reductions in Soviet tanks.

In June 1976, the East changed its tactics but yielded nothing of substance. Hitherto, it had tabled no figures for the size of its forces. Now, it declared that it had 987,300 ground and air force personnel, 805,000 of them ground troops. These figures were designed to suggest that the East had a numerical superiority over the West of no more than about 14,000 troops in the zone of reductions.

From this point on, the Soviet Union shifted its position to accept, for the first time, the principle of parity, but it contended that, given the alleged rough equality of forces, almost equal reductions of the two sides would suffice to reach parity. The East followed up its data figures with a new proposal in 1978 calling for equal ceilings of 700,000 for ground forces arrived at through substantially equal reductions: 105,000 from the Warsaw Pact and 91,000 from NATO.

[1]The Western proposal eventually was superseded by NATO's 1979 decision to offer separate negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces while unilaterally withdrawing 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe before those negotiations began.

The West's quarrel with the Eastern position was not with the proposed common ceiling of 700,000, which had been the centerpiece of its own proposal of 1973; rather, it objected to the Eastern contention that the current level of forces on the two sides was roughly equal and that the common ceilings could thus be reached by roughly equal reductions of the kind the Soviets had proposed. In fact, the West has consistently estimated that Eastern ground forces were larger by some 170,000 men than the Eastern figures.

The Soviet Union has refused ever since to cooperate with Western efforts to identify the source of the manpower discrepancy. Eastern negotiators allege that Western probing is designed to extract secret information about Eastern forces that the Soviet General Staff considers essential to national security and to gain a unilateral military advantage for NATO by demanding large, asymmetrical Eastern force reductions. Comparable information on Western forces is publicly available.

The actual level of Soviet and other Eastern forces in the area has been one of the most important unresolved issues in MBFR; since 1976 the data dispute has been the central stumbling block in the negotiations.

Despite Soviet unwillingness to resolve the data question and accept genuine parity, the West was committed to making progress toward an agreement. In 1978, the West offered to guarantee that European NATO forces would be reduced following initial U.S. and Soviet reductions. In December 1979, the West scaled back demands for initial reductions in the hope that this would facilitate early progress. Under this new Western proposal, the first phase would entail reductions of 13,000 U.S. and 30,000 Soviet soldiers (three divisions)—a considerable modification of the

original Western demand for the first-phase removal of a complete Soviet tank army. The West also proposed a comprehensive package of associated measures designed to ensure that a treaty would be effective and verifiable.

Speaking to the West German Parliament in June 1982, President Reagan reaffirmed that an MBFR agreement was an important objective of his Administration. A month later, the West presented a new draft treaty that represented another major effort to address Eastern concerns while preserving the Western requirement for parity and adequate associated measures.

In some respects the 1982 draft treaty was a significant departure from previous Western approaches, although the fundamental principle—reductions to equal ceilings of 700,000 ground force personnel and 900,000 ground and air force personnel combined—remained unchanged.

The major innovation of the Western draft was that it would bind all direct participants in one agreement to undertake the reductions required to reach the ceiling. This provision sought to address the frequently expressed Soviet concern that initial Soviet reductions might not be followed by reductions in the forces of the United States' NATO allies.

Consistent with previous Western approaches, the draft treaty called for associated measures intended to give each side confidence in the other's compliance. These measures provided for:

- Prenotification of activity by one or more division formations outside the division's garrison area;
- Provisions to permit observers at such activities;
- Prenotification of major movements of ground forces into the area of reductions;
- An annual quota of on-call inspections;

White House (Karl Schumacher)

President Reagan receives a standing ovation following his address to the German Bundestag in Bonn in which he called for progress in nuclear and conventional arms control and foreshadowed a new Western initiative at the MBFR talks in Vienna, June 9, 1982.

• Designation of permanent entry and exit points into and from the area of reductions, with observers stationed at these points;

• Exchange of information on forces to be withdrawn and continuing periodic exchanges of information on residual forces; and

• Noninterference with national technical means of verification.

In February and June 1983, the East made new proposals, the principal elements of which were:

• U.S./Soviet reductions by "mutual example," that is, outside the context of an agreement;

• An agreed freeze on all forces and armaments in the MBFR area subsequent to the U.S./Soviet reductions; and

• Subsequent negotiation of a treaty binding all direct participants to reductions in a single phase. The East suggested that such a treaty be based on its 1982 draft.

In this proposal and others, the East has agreed in principle with some key Western verification measures such as inspection, but the agreement has been hedged with restrictive conditions, and the East has been reluctant to discuss details.

Although there are some positive elements in the East's approach, it is still clearly inadequate because it fails to address the crucial question of data and to resolve the problem of verification.

In April 1984, the West presented a new MBFR initiative aimed at breaking the impasse over data and verification issues. The heart of that initiative is a proposal of Western flexibility on data in exchange for Eastern flexibility in meeting Western verification requirements.

The new proposal modifies previous Western data requirements in two ways:

• Data are required before treaty signature only for ground combat and combat support forces (roughly 60% of the total forces and 75% of the ground forces in the reductions area); and

• Precise agreement on these data is not required, only that they fall within an acceptable range of Western estimates.

In return, the East is asked to accept the Western package of verification measures (outlined in the 1982 Western draft treaty) with the following modifications:

• Increased numbers, duration, area of onsite inspections and increased size of inspection teams;

• Observation of the process of reductions, vacating garrison, and departure of the area; and

• Exchange of a more detailed breakdown of information on individual force components.

Limiting the initial data exchange to combat/combat support forces focuses the negotiations on forces most responsible for the combat potential of the sides and on those having more apparent structure and more predictable manpower. Therefore, the prospect for agreement on the current levels of ground combat/combat support forces should be better than for total forces. Determining the numbers of other forces in the reductions area would be deferred for 2 years, pending onsite verification through reciprocal, cooperative measures.

The full schedule of reductions to parity would not be established until data on all forces is agreed. But the proposal requires the United States and the Soviet Union to commit to a schedule of

major reductions in their ground combat/combat support forces on the basis of the pre-treaty data exchange.

Requirement for Progress

The new Western treaty proposal contains the necessary elements to break the impasse. The initial Soviet reaction, however, has not been positive, and until the East demonstrates a willingness through concrete actions to accept the necessary asymmetrical reductions to reach parity, progress almost certainly will continue to be curtailed.

Although the lack of concrete results thus far has been disappointing, the West has made some progress. The principles of collectivity and parity seem finally to be established; associated measures have been proposed that would contribute substantially to stability and confidence in Europe; and a better understanding of the two sides' security concerns has evolved.

The MFBR talks began because the United States and its NATO allies believed that a satisfactory solution to the problem of Eastern conventional force superiority is a negotiated agreement leading to force parity at lower overall levels. The West remains committed to that goal and convinced that such an agreement would ultimately increase the security of all the peoples of Europe.

Confidence-Building Measures

Nature and Purpose

Confidence-building measures—unlike arms reductions provisions, which seek to constrain the size, weaponry, or structure of military forces—are designed to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding about military forces and activities. Their overall purpose is to reduce the possibility of an accidental confrontation through miscalculation or failure of communicaton, to inhibit opportunities for surprise attack, and to enhance stability in times of calm or crisis.

Confidence-building measures are an important part of U.S. efforts to achieve greater security and stability. Although they do not themselves reduce forces or armaments, by providing for more effective and timely exchange of information and greater reciprocal understanding of intentions and actions, they can help reduce the possibility of an East-West confrontation arising by accident or miscalculation.

U.S.-Soviet confidence-building measures include the "Hotline" Agreement and the "Accidents Measures" and Incidents at Sea Agreements. Multilateral measures in force are contained in the CSCE Final Act, signed in Helsinki in 1975. The principal confidence-building feature of the Final Act is the agreement of both East and West to prior notification of large military maneuvers. This concept has been incorporated into the Western proposal at the MBFR negotiations. The allies have also presented a package of confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) talks in Stockholm.

In 1982, President Reagan proposed a new set of U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral confidence-building measures, including prior notification of ballistic missile launches, prior notification of major military exercises, and expanded exchange of forces data. These proposals were submitted at the START and INF negotiations. In addition, President Reagan in 1983 proposed an important set of measures to improve the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate rapidly and urgently. Those proposals, on which the United

States and the U.S.S.R. began negotiating in August 1983, include improving the hotline, establishing a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Military Communications Link, and improving Embassy-capital communications. In July 1984, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to improve the hotline by adding a high-speed facsimile capability to the existing teletype equipment. This will enable both countries to send charts, photos, and other graphic materials almost instantaneously.

Bilateral Agreements: Nuclear Forces and Crisis Stability

Over the last two decades, the United States and the Soviet Union have reached agreement on several measures designed to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.

- The "Hotline" Agreement, signed in 1963, established a direct teletype communications link between Washington and Moscow. A second agreement, signed in 1971, provided for upgrading the hotline by adding satellite circuits which began operation in 1978. Further agreement to add high-speed facsimile capability was reached in July 1984.
- The "Accidents Measures" Agreement, signed in 1971, requires each side to maintain safeguards against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; to notify the other side before planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party in the direction of the other party; and to notify each other immediately in the event of an accidental, unauthorized, or any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon.
- The Incidents at Sea Agreement, signed in 1972, enjoins the two sides to observe strictly the letter and spirit of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea; to refrain from provocative acts at sea that could increase the risk of war; and to notify mariners of actions on the high seas representing a danger to navigation or to aircraft.
- Article XVI of the SALT II agreement contained a provision requiring advance notification of all multiple ICBM launches (more than one ICBM in flight at the same time) or single ICBM launches planned to extend beyond the national territory of the notifying side, regardless of direction.

Confidence-Building Measures in the START and INF Talks

In his Berlin speech of June 11, 1982; at the UN Special Session on Disarmament on June 17, 1982; and in his speech of November 22, 1982, the President pledged to leave no stone unturned in the effort to reinforce peace and lessen the risk of war. Recognizing the need to improve mutual communication and confidence, he suggested various ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union could deal with this problem. These included reciprocal exchanges in such areas as advance notification of major exercises, an expansion of agreed advance notification of ICBM launches, and an expanded exchange of strategic forces data. As the President stated in Berlin:

> Taken together, these steps would represent a qualitative improvement in the nuclear environment. They would help reduce the chances of misinterpretation in the case of exercises and test launches. And they would reduce the secrecy and ambiguity which surround military activity.

After thorough study of ways to implement and expand the President's proposals, the United States proposed to the Soviet Union at the START and INF talks in Geneva those measures mentioned by the President in Berlin as well as two additional ones: advance notification of launches of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and of land-based, longer range INF ballistic missiles. At U.S. initiative, a Working Group on Confidence-Building Measures was established within the START negotiations in the fall of 1983.

Notification of ICBM Launches. Several U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreements provide for advance notification of certain ICBM launches. None, however, covers all ICBM launches, since none covers single launches that impact within the territory of the launching nation. Because any launch could in some circumstances create uncertainty, the United States proposed in START that the sides provide notice of all ICBM launches, whether they occur singly or in multiples, whether their flights remain within national boundaries or extend beyond them.

Notification of SLBM Launches. At present, the United States and the U.S.S.R. do not notify each other of sea-launched ballistic missile launches; they do issue standard notices to airmen and mariners, announcing "closure areas," if an SLBM is expected to impact in international waters. To reduce any possibility of misinterpretation, the United States has proposed that both sides provide advance notification of all their SLBM launches, including those impacting within national territory. Along with the ICBM notification measure, this would mean that for the first time advance notification would be required for all launches of strategic ballistic missiles in the arsenals of both sides.

Notification of Longer Range INF Ballistic Missile Launches. The United States also proposed in the INF negotiations that advance notification be provided for all launches of LRINF ballistic missiles. These include the Soviet Union's SS-20 and SS-4 missiles, and the U.S. Pershing II.

Prior Notification of Major Nuclear Force Exercises. Each year U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces conduct large-scale military exercises intended to develop, perfect, or refine plans, procedures, or operations, and to provide training. The United States has proposed that each side provide notification in advance of those major exercises to avoid raising the concerns of the other side. This would complement the reciprocal notifications on conventional maneuvers covered by the Helsinki Final Act and those which are currently being negotiated in the CDE.

Expanded Exchange of Forces Data. The United States also proposed in the START and INF talks that both parties agree to an expanded exchange of information on their strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces. This detailed exchange of information would help reduce the risk of misinterpreting actions involving such forces and enhance understanding of each other's capabilities. Moreover, such exchanges are important to the successful negotiation of any START or INF agreement, since those agreements would entail substantial reductions and restrictions on many systems. The expanded data exchange would be an important step in the verification of those agreements.

U.S.-Soviet Communications Improvements

In May 1983, the President strongly endorsed a Department of Defense report to Congress recommending additional proposals to strengthen stability and

reduce the risk of accident or miscalculation. The proposals resulted from more than a year's study, in close consultation with Congress. The specific proposals are:

- Addition of a high-speed facsimile capability to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. hotline (on which agreement was reached in July 1984), which will permit transmission of more complex data, including full pages of text, maps, and graphs. This capability will increase the speed and reliability of communications, thereby improving both sides' ability to clarify ambiguous situations;
- Establishment of a Joint Military Communications Link, a high-speed facsimile link that would supplement the hotline and existing diplomatic channels. Its primary purpose would be to facilitate rapid communication regarding the military aspects of nuclear or other military crises; and
- Establishment by the U.S. and Soviet Governments of improved communications with their embassies in each other's capitals. These improved communications could supplement both the hotline and the Joint Military Communications Link. Each government would install and control its own system.

Each of those measures would increase our ability to resolve crisis situations and prevent military escalation. Taken together, they would mark a substantial advance toward further reducing the risk that accident or misinterpretation could ever lead to war.

Although the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement to improve the hotline in July 1984, the Soviet Union has not expressed any interest in the two other U.S. proposed communications improvements.

Multilateral Negotiations: Confidence-Building Measures on Conventional Forces

CSCE. Certain confidence-building measures are now in effect throughout Europe as a result of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Negotiated between 1973 and 1975 at the 35-nation CSCE, they provide for notification of major maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops; voluntary notification of smaller scale maneuvers; and invitation of observers to these activities. The Final Act also notes the value of notification of other large-scale troop movements, below the 25,000 level, but does not require such a step.

As arms control devices, the confidence-building measures in the Final Act have made only a modest contribution. They are limited in the activities covered, in the specificity of their provisions, and in their geographic applicability. Furthermore, the Soviets violated the Helsinki Final Act by failing to give adequate notification of one major exercise in 1981.

MBFR. The next phase in the evolution of Western thinking on the potential of confidence-building measures centered on the MBFR negotiations. During the late 1970s, the West began considering in greater depth the military and verification implications of an MBFR agreement that would reduce and limit NATO forces. In particular, concerns arose about a possible situation following conventional force reductions in which the activities of residual Warsaw Pact forces might appear so threatening as to unravel MBFR constraints against a military buildup. These concerns prompted an exhaustive discussion among NATO's MBFR participants on ways in which provisions similar to confidence-building measures

might contribute not only to verification of troop cuts and limitations but also to greater military stability following reductions.

The result was a NATO initiative in 1979 to negotiate, concurrently with an MBFR reductions agreement, a package of stringent new verification and stabilization measures. These measures called for a detailed inspection regime, controls on exit and entry of manpower into the zone of reductions, exchanges of information on the size and structure of military forces, and notification of movements of major military formations into and within Europe. Since then, there has been some progress on clarifying the issues involved, but the Eastern participants have resisted key elements of the Western package.

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The next stage in the evolution of Western efforts to develop confidence-building measures resulted from the French proposal in May 1978 for a conference on disarmament in Europe.

The Madrid CSCE Review Conference, which concluded in September 1983, agreed to a CDE within the overall CSCE process and directed it to take the first steps to negotiate a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. The CDE, at least initially, is concerned not with force or arms limitations but rather with how such forces are used. The measures to be negotiated must be militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe—including Soviet territory as far east as the Ural Mountains.

Implicit in the Helsinki CSCE Final Act, and reaffirmed in the November 1983 Helsinki CDE Preparatory Conference decision document, is that CDE will not interfere with other, ongoing negotiations—such as MBFR and the Geneva-based UN Conference on Disarmament—and that its future schedule and agenda will depend on the CSCE Review Conference in Vienna in 1986. The CDE began on January 17, 1984, in Stockholm and will continue with brief recesses until the next CSCE Review Conference in Vienna in 1986.

The Western Position

From the Western perspective, the CDE is primarily a conference about surprise attack in Europe. Its purpose is to promote greater openness and predictability in military activities. Measures proposed by the West are intended to:

- Reduce the risk of conflict by surprise attack or miscalculation;
- Inhibit displays of force for purposes of intimidation; and
- Enhance communications among participating states.

With these objectives in mind, the United States and its allies have developed a coherent package of confidence- and security-building measures. These measures, frequently referred to as "openness measures" and introduced by the West on January 24, 1984, call for:

- Information exchange on ground and air forces in the CDE zone;
- Forecasts and notifications of military activities in the zone, including amphibious operations, mobilizations, and alert activities, as well as regular out-of-garrison activities;
- Mandatory invitations to observers at these activities;
- The right of onsite and aerial inspection by challenge; and
- Facilities for improved communication between participants.

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Secretary Shultz is greeted by Swedish Foreign Affairs Minister Lennart Bodstrom upon arrival in Stockholm on January 16, 1984, to attend the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

Consistent with the CDE mandate, the Western proposals call for concrete actions that can contribute meaningfully to peace and stability. They represent a significant advance over the confidence-building measures contained in the Helsinki Final Act because they will all be mandatory, verifiable, applicable to the whole of Europe, and cover more military activities. The Western approach to the CDE also complements efforts in other arms control forums (START, INF, MBFR, and the Conference on Disarmament), and other security negotiations such as upgrading the U.S.-U.S.S.R. hotline.

The Eastern Position

The East, led by the Soviet Union, has promoted six proposals at Stockholm featuring a proposed agreement or treaty on the non-use of force, linked to a proposed agreement on non-first-use of nuclear weapons. The other four proposals call for establishing nuclear weapons free zones, reductions of military budgets, a ban on chemical weapons in Europe, and an expansion of the Helsinki confidence-building measures.

These proposals were presented in Stockholm at the beginning of the second round on May 8, 1984. Many have been featured in the Eastern agenda for some time. All appeared in the Prague Declaration issued at the Warsaw Pact summit in January 1983. Except for the last measure, they are generally inconsistent with the conference mandate. The Soviets contend that the Western package of "openness measures" is a cover for spying and that in any event the Western package of confidence- and security-building measures is too technical. The West, by contrast, will continue to insist on measures that contribute specifically to European security rather than merely repeat existing promises of good behavior.

In his speech before the Irish Parliament on June 4, 1984, President Reagan affirmed U.S. willingness to consider the Soviet proposal for a declaration on the non-use of force "if discussions on re affirming the principle not to use force, a principle in which we believe so deeply, will bring the Soviet Union to negotiate agreements which will give concrete new meaning to that principle. . . ." The Soviet Union had not taken up that offer by the time the negotiating session adjourned in July 1984.

The Soviet Approach to Confidence-Building Measures

The Soviet Union has expressed support in principle for progress in confidence-building measures both in the CSCE context and in START. However, experience suggests that the Soviets have a different view of these measures than the West. The Soviet concept in many cases emphasizes voluntary expressions of good will rather than concrete contributions to stability. Thus, the West often has encountered difficulty in turning expressed Soviet interest into specific measures. Frequently, Soviet proposals have involved declaratory devices, such as non-use of force pledges, which would add nothing to European security or to commitments already undertaken in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. In other instances in which the Soviets have advanced proposals that would restrict specific military activities, the measures have been vague or designed to inhibit U.S. and allied military flexibility critical to maintaining an effective deterrent, while leaving Soviet forces and activities relatively unaffected.

Conclusion

The United States has taken the initiative in proposing in START, INF, and other forums a broad range of bilateral measures aimed at strengthening mutual confidence and reducing the risk of nuclear conflict as the result of accident or miscalculation. The United States has continued to work closely with its allies in the MBFR talks and the CDE to identify and negotiate agreements on concrete measures to decrease the dangers of conventional conflict.

The success of these efforts will depend largely on the readiness of the Soviet Union to move beyond simple declaratory gestures to the negotiation of meaningful and effective confidence-building measures.

Chemical Weapons

The use of chemical weapons in warfare is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and by customary international law, but there are no restrictions on the production and stockpiling of such weapons. Moreover, the Geneva Protocol lacks provisions for verifying or enforcing compliance—a deficiency highlighted by use of chemical and toxin weapons by the Soviet Union and its allies since the mid-1970s in Southeast Asia; in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion in 1979; and more recently by Iraq in its conflict with Iran. The United States is seeking to improve compliance with existing agreements and to negotiate a more effective prohibition. On April 18, 1984, in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the United States introduced a draft treaty calling for a comprehensive and verifiable global ban on chemical weapons. Progress depends largely on whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept effective provisions for verification and compliance.

Background

Chemical weapons were first used in World War I. By the time the war ended, chemical warfare had claimed more than 1 million casualties. To prevent a recurrence of this tragedy, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, one of the oldest arms control agreements still in force, was negotiated. This treaty prohibits the use in war of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous materials, liquids or devices," as well as "bacteriological methods of warfare."

Although outlawing the use of both chemical and biological weapons, the Geneva Protocol places no limits on production and stockpiling. Moreover, it has no provisions to ensure verification and deal with issues of compliance. It has proven tragically inadequate to prevent use of chemical weapons against defenseless people.

The United States is committed to a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons production and stockpiling and to ensuring the destruction of existing chemical weapons stocks and production facilities. This goal is being pursued in the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where the United States has presented a draft treaty banning chemical weapons. Central to the U.S. proposal are strong verification and compliance provisions, including automatic and unimpeded onsite challenge inspections of military and government-owned or -controlled facilities in the event of a suspected treaty violation.

The Soviet Union, though stating that it, too, seeks a complete ban on chemical weapons, has not shown itself willing to accept such measures. It maintains a large chemical weapons production and military training program, and more than 80,000 chemical weapons specialists are in the Soviet ground forces alone. This far exceeds the chemical weapons posture of all other states together and, combined with the use of chemical weapons by the Soviets and their allies in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, raises serious questions regarding Soviet intent to comply with a chemical weapons ban.

Chemical Weapons Use

Reports of the use of lethal chemical weapons began to emerge from Laos nearly 9 years ago. Five years ago similar reports started coming from Afghanistan. Early reports were infrequent and fragmentary, reflecting the remoteness of the conflict and the isolation of the victims. In the summer of 1979, the U.S. Department of State prepared a detailed compilation of interviews with refugees from Laos on this subject. That fall, a U.S. Army medical team visited Laos to conduct further interviews. By the winter of 1979, the United States felt it had sufficient evidence to raise the matter with the Governments of Laos, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.

Dissatisfied with their responses, the United States began raising the issue publicly in the United Nations, before the Congress, and in other forums. In 1980, U.S. experts initiated a review of all reporting back to 1975. In mid-1981, these experts began testing physical samples from Southeast Asia for the presence of toxins—biologically produced chemical poisons whose production, stockpiling, and use are prohibited by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

On March 22, 1982, the Secretary of State submitted a report to Congress (Special Report No. 98) setting forth the results of the U.S. investigation. This report was updated by Special Report No. 104, issued in November 1982. Subsequent reports were issued in August 1983 and February 1984. These reports drew upon the following evidence:

- Testimony of those who saw or experienced chemical weapons attacks;

• Testimony of physicians, refugee workers, journalists, and others who had the opportunity to question witnesses or victims;

• Testimony of those who had engaged in chemical warfare or were in a position to observe those who did;

• Scientific analysis of physical samples taken from sites where attacks took place;

• Documentary evidence from open sources; and

• Intelligence derived from national technical and other means.

In the words of Special Report No. 98:

> . . . taken together, this evidence has led the U.S. Government to conclude that Lao and Vietnamese forces, operating under Soviet supervision, have since 1975 employed lethal chemical and toxin weapons in Laos; that Vietnamese forces have, since 1978, used lethal chemical and toxin agents in Kampuchea; and that Soviet forces have used a variety of lethal chemical warfare agents, including nerve gases, in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion of that country in 1979.

In December 1980, the UN General Assembly initiated an international investigation into the use of chemical weapons. In December 1982, the Experts Group directed by the General Assemby to conduct the investigation issued its report. The report supported U.S. claims in more than a dozen specific technical areas and faulted in strong language the Soviet "scientific explanation" for the presence of toxins in physical samples from Southeast Asia. The Experts Group concluded that it "could not disregard the circumstantial evidence suggestive of the possible use of some sort of toxic chemical substance in some instances." The General Assembly was sufficiently concerned that it established permanent UN machinery to permit further investigation of allegations of chemical weapons use.

In March 1984, the United Nations investigated charges of Iraqi chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war. The investigation concluded that both mustard gas and the nerve agent tabun have been used against Iranian forces. The United States has confirmed these reports independently and has condemned such chemical weapons use. In addition, the United States and several other Western countries have placed special export controls on selected chemicals that have been used by Iraq to make chemical weapons.

Arms Control Implications of Chemical Weapons Use

Soviet involvement in the use of chemical and toxin weapons violates the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. It highlights the limitations of treaties lacking effective provisions for verification and compliance. Use of chemical weapons by Iraq—a party to the Geneva Protocol—heightens these concerns.

This illegal use of chemical weapons underlines the importance of effective verification and compliance mechanisms in any chemical weapons ban. The Soviet Union has consistently described U.S. insistence on such mechanisms as an attempt to block progress toward prohibiting chemical weapons use. In fact, this U.S. insistence reflects a desire to ensure that a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons production and stockpiling could be effective.

Soviet use of toxin weapons also demonstrates the need to strengthen the inadequate compliance mechanisms contained in the Biological Weapons Convention. In late 1982, the UN General Assembly, by a vote of 124–15 (with 1 abstention), supported convening a conference of the states' parties to the con-

vention to discuss ways to make the convention more effective. The initiative came from a number of neutral and nonaligned nations, led by Sweden; virtually its sole opponents were the Soviet Union and its allies. The United States strongly supports the proposal for a conference.

The United States and Control of Chemical Weapons

U.S. opposition to chemical warfare is as old as such warfare itself: in May 1915, a month after the first use of poison gas in World War I, President Wilson proposed the discontinuance of its use. The belligerents rejected the proposal. In 1922, chemical warfare was on the agenda of the U.S.-sponsored Washington Disarmament Conference. At American initiative, a prohibition on "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices" was included in the text of a treaty negotiated at the conference but which never entered into force due to the failure of other states to ratify.

This prohibition was repeated in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, with the inclusion of language prohibiting bacteriological warfare as well. The protocol grew out of a U.S. suggestion that the 1925 Geneva Conference for the Supervision of the International Traffic in Arms address the task of banning chemical weapons. Unfortunately the protocol, lacking any provisions for ensuring compliance, did not offer adequate guarantees against the threat of illicit chemical weapons use.

During World War II, it was not the Geneva Protocol which prevented use of chemical weapons, but deterrence. The United States and Great Britain made clear they would not use chemical weapons first but would retaliate against military objectives if the Axis Powers employed them. In 1943, President Roosevelt stated that the United States would regard a chemical attack upon any of its allies as an attack upon itself. As a result, poison gas was not used.

In 1969, the United States reaffirmed that it would not be the first to use chemical weapons and that it would not use, under any circumstances, biological and toxin weapons. Subsequently, the United States played a leading role in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (a forerunner of the Conference on Disarmament) in negotiating the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972.

From 1977 to 1980, the United States engaged in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union in an effort to further progress toward a chemical weapons treaty. That effort proved fruitless due to Soviet unwillingness to accept effective verification and compliance measures.

U.S. policy on chemical warfare seeks an effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban and, as both a negotiating incentive and a hedge against negotiating failure, to maintain a limited deterrent capability. Deterrence is, of course, fundamental to NATO's defense strategy. Under present conditions, faced with a significant Soviet offensive chemical warfare capability, the United States must maintain a limited chemical weapons retaliatory capability.

U.S. efforts to ban chemical weapons are concentrated in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. For the past 4 years, the United States has been active in the conference's chemical weapons working group, helping focus attention on the necessary elements for an effective chemical weapons prohibition.

The draft treaty presented by Vice President Bush on April 18, 1984, contains detailed provisions to ensure compliance with a ban, including:

- Declaration and systematic international onsite inspection of chemical weapons stocks and production facilities and declaration of plans for destruction of the stocks;
- Systematic international onsite inspection of the destruction of both chemical weapons stocks and production facilities;
- Declaration and onsite inspection of the operation of other facilities for legal production of chemicals posing a high risk of diversion to chemical weapons production; and
- An "open invitation" challenge inspection provision whereby suspected treaty violations in military or government-owned or -controlled facilities would be investigated within 24 hours of a complaint.

Prospects

As Vice President Bush made clear in his April 1984 address, the United States is fully committed to working toward a verifiable prohibition on chemical weapons development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use. Such a prohibition must include effective means of verifying compliance and investigating suspected cases of noncompliance. Provision for onsite inspection



White House

Vice President Bush presents U.S. draft treaty banning chemical weapons to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, April 18, 1984.

of facilities, stocks, and the destruction process must be among them. "National means" suggested by the Soviets are equivalent to self-inspection, and "national technical means," such as reconnaissance satellites, cannot alone guarantee that we could detect cheating.

This is because clandestine production of chemical weapons could take place in a factory with no special outward characteristics, while clandestine chemical weapons stocks could be stored almost anywhere. The U.S. "open invitation" inspection proposal is, therefore, designed to provide confidence that an eventual ban will not be violated.

The United States, together with other Western and developing countries, will continue to press in the Conference on Disarmament for an effective chemical weapons ban. The draft treaty presented in Geneva will help keep efforts concentrated on the issues of verification and compliance. The United States is working to ensure that this effort will result in a treaty that will permanently abolish the practice and the threat of chemical weapons use.

Space Arms Control

The United States has played a lead role in negotiating international agreements governing space activities, including the Outer Space Treaty, Limited Test Ban Treaty, and ABM Treaty. These and other agreements constitute an extensive body of international law pertaining to military activity in space. At U.S. initiative, bilateral talks with the Soviet Union on antisatellite arms control were held during 1978–79. The United States supports formation of a committee to address a broad range of space arms control issues in the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In June 1984, the Soviets proposed talks on outer space arms control, including antisatellite weapons (ASATs), to take place in September in Vienna. The United States accepted at once, without preconditions. The Soviets have subsequently hardened their position, set forth preconditions, and rejected coming to the Vienna talks which they themselves had proposed. The United States remains ready for serious talks at any time.

Outer Space Treaty

Background. The Soviets launched Sputnik I, the first artificial satellite of the earth, October 4, 1957. Earlier that year, developments in rocketry had already led the United States to propose international verification of the testing of space objects. The development of an inspection system for outer space was part of a Western proposal for partial disarmament put forward in August 1957. The U.S.S.R., in the midst of testing its first ICBM, did not accept these proposals.

Between 1959 and 1962 the Western powers made a series of proposals to bar the use of outer space for military purposes. Their successive proposals for general and complete disarmament included provisions to ban the orbiting and stationing in outer space of weapons of mass destruction. Addressing the UN General Assembly on September 22, 1960, President Eisenhower proposed that the principles of the Antarctic Treaty—which internationalized and demilitarized that continent and provided for its cooperative exploration and future use—be applied to outer space and celestial bodies.

Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament between 1960 and 1962 included provisions for ensuring the peaceful use of outer space. The Soviet Union, however, would not

separate outer space from other disarmament issues. The Western powers objected to the Soviet approach, which was tied to unacceptable demands in other areas and designed to upset the military balance.

UN Resolution. After the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the Soviet Union's position changed. On September 19, 1963, Foreign Minister Gromyko told the UN General Assembly that the U.S.S.R. wished to conclude an agreement to ban placing nuclear weapons in orbit. U.S. Ambassador Stevenson stated that the United States had no intention of orbiting weapons of mass destruction, installing them on celestial bodies, or otherwise stationing them in outer space. The General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on October 17, 1963, welcoming the Soviet and American statements and calling upon all states to refrain from introducing weapons of mass destruction into outer space.

The United States supported the resolution. Seeking to sustain the momentum for arms control agreements, the United States pressed for a treaty to give further substance to the UN resolution.

Treaty Negotiated. On June 16, 1966, both the United States and the Soviet Union submitted draft treaties. The American draft dealt with celestial bodies; the Soviet draft covered the whole outer space environment. The United States accepted the Soviet position on the scope of the treaty, and by September, agreement had been reached in discussions at Geneva on most treaty provisions. By December, differences on the few remaining issues—chiefly involving access to facilities on celestial bodies, reporting on space activities, and the use of military equipment and personnel in space exploration—had been satisfactorily resolved in private consultations.

On December 19, the General Assembly approved by acclamation a resolution commending the treaty. It was opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967. On April 25, the Senate gave unanimous consent to its ratification, and the treaty entered into force on October 10, 1967.

The substance of the treaty's arms control provisions is in article IV, which restricts military activities in two ways:

- First, it contains an undertaking not to place in orbit around the earth, install on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space, nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction.
- Second, it limits the use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for establishing military bases, installations, or fortifications; testing weapons of any kind; or conducting military maneuvers.

In addition, the treaty explicity enjoins states to observe existing international law, including the UN Charter, in their activities in the exploration and use of outer space.

U.S. Space Policy

U.S. national space policy was stated by President Reagan on July 4, 1982, and reaffirmed in his March 31, 1984 Report to Congress Concerning U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control. Its basic goals are to strengthen the security of the United States; maintain U.S. leadership in the exploration of space; obtain economic and scientific benefits through the exploitation of space; expand U.S. private-sector investment and involvement in civil space and space-related activities; promote international cooperative activities that are in the national interest;

and cooperate with other nations in maintaining the freedom of space for all activities that enhance the security and welfare of mankind.

The United States will conduct its space program in accordance with important principles, among which are: a commitment to the exploration and use of space by all nations for peaceful purposes and the benefit of mankind; rejection of any claim to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies; recognition that space systems of any nation are national property with the right of passage through and operations in space without interference; implementation of two types of U.S. space programs—national security and civil; pursuit of activities in space in support of the U.S. right of self-defense; and a continuing study of further space arms control options.

In that regard, the President made clear that:

> . . . the United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems, should those measures be compatible with United States national security.

ASAT Arms Control

Current Soviet Capabilities and Threat. Current Soviet ASAT capabilities include an operational co-orbital interceptor system, ground-based test lasers with probable ASAT capabilities, nuclear-armed Galosh ABM interceptors with residual ASAT capabilities, and the technological capability to mount electronic countermeasures against space systems. The co-orbital interceptor system—deployed for over a decade and the world's only operational ASAT—represents a threat to low-altitude U.S. satellites.

The United States currently has under development its only ASAT system, a miniature vehicle (MV) system which will be launched from an F-15 aircraft. The MV is designed to operate only at low altitudes, thereby offsetting the existing Soviet system.

The MV would be able to deter threats to U.S. and allied space systems by providing the capability to respond in kind to a Soviet ASAT attack. It would also help deter war by being able, within the limits of international law, to deny any adversary the use of some space-based systems that provide support to hostile military forces. These include satellites which would provide targeting intelligence to Soviet weapon platforms for attacking U.S. and allied naval and land forces. The MV cannot and need not attack Soviet early warning satellites at high altitudes.

Previous Negotiations. At the initiative of the United States, bilateral negotiations between the United States and U.S.S.R. on the control of ASATs were held in 1978–79. These talks involved an extensive discussion of some of the problems of space arms control and revealed major differences between the two sides. Further U.S. study since then has brought the whole topic of space arms control into sharper focus.

Soviet Activities. Although the Soviets have periodically tested their operational ASAT interceptor, they regularly advance space arms control measures such as moratorium proposals in international fora, without acknowledging their own ASAT capabilities. In August 1983, they submitted a draft treaty to the UN General Assembly calling for the elimination of existing ASAT systems, for a ban on the development of new ASATs, and for a ban on attacks on satellites. At the same time, they also announced a "unilateral moratorium" on

launching of ASAT weapons so long as other countries refrained from putting ASAT weapons into space.

The wording of these proposals had major ambiguities and loopholes. The Soviet initiatives pose profound verification problems, as in the case of their draft treaty, and, in the case of both the treaty and the moratorium offer, would leave the U.S.S.R. with a deployed system and thus a destabilizing advantage.

Considerations Affecting U.S. Policy. The United States has been studying a range of options for further space arms control measures with a view to possible negotiations with the Soviet Union and other nations, if such negotiations could lead to equitable and verifiable agreements compatible with U.S. national security interests. Attention has particularly focused on possible ASAT arms control measures.

The potential benefits of any ASAT control regime would depend on both its framework and its details. The spectrum of possible space arms control measures includes bans on specialized ASAT weapons and much less ambitious undertakings. To be acceptable, any measure must be equitable, effectively verifiable, and compatible with our national security. Any space arms control measures that met these criteria, and were complied with, would have a number of potential benefits. For example, depending on the scope and effectiveness of any agreement, it might:

- Limit specialized threats to satellites and constrain future threats to such key satellites as those for early warning. Such limitations on specialized threats to satellites, together with satellite survivability measures, could help preserve and enhance stability.
- Raise the political threshold for attacks against satellites. Restricting threatening activity and/or prohibiting attacks on satellites would add to existing international law aimed at lowering the likelihood of conflict in space.
- Meet some international concerns regarding the use of space for military purposes.

The U.S. review of space arms control possibilities thus far suggests a number of difficulties which must be overcome if effective arms control measures on ASATs are to be achieved. Those difficulties include:

Verification—A ban on all ASAT systems would require elimination of the current Soviet ASAT interceptor system, but no satisfactory means has been found to verify Soviet compliance effectively. Cheating on ASAT limitations, even on a small scale, could pose a disproportionate risk to the United States, so verification would be particularly important.

Breakout—This is the risk that a nation could gain a unilateral advantage if the agreement ceased to remain in force for any reason—for example, through sudden abrogation—and obtain a head start in building or deploying a type of weapon which has been banned or severely limited.

Definition—Defining what constitutes an ASAT weapon for arms control purposes is very difficult. This problem is compounded because even non-weapon space systems, including civil systems, may have characteristics difficult to distinguish from those of weapons. Furthermore, many systems not primarily designed to be ASAT weapons have inherent (or residual) ASAT capabilities.

Vulnerability of Satellite Support Systems—An ASAT ban would not ensure survivability of other elements in a space system. Ground stations, launch facilities, and communications links may be more vulnerable than the satellites themselves.

Soviet Nonweapon Military Space Threat—As noted, examination of space arms control needs to include consideration of the growing threat posed by current and projected Soviet space systems which, while not weapons themselves, are designed to support directly the U.S.S.R.'s terrestrial forces in the event of a conflict.

U.S. Accepts Soviet Offer of Vienna Talks

The President's March 1984 report to Congress on ASAT arms control policy made clear that the door was not closed to ASAT arms control and that the United States was seeking to develop effective measures to limit specific systems. On June 29, 1984, the Soviets proposed talks on "preventing the militarization of outer space" to begin in Vienna in September. They specifically put ASATs on the agenda. The United States accepted without preconditions, explicitly stating that it intended to discuss and seek agreement on feasible negotiating approaches which could lead to verifiable and effective limitations on ASATs, as well as any other arms control concerns of interest to both sides.

At the same time, the United States noted that the "militarization of space" began when the first ballistic missiles were tested and when such missiles and other weapons systems using outer space began to be developed. Thus, the problem of weapons in space cannot be considered in isolation from the overall strategic relationship. Accordingly, the United States made clear it would seek to discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons could be resumed.

In the weeks following the initial Soviet offer, the United States sought to make necessary arrangements for the Vienna talks throught confidential diplomatic channels. However, the Soviets insisted on making the diplomatic exchanges public and, in doing so, repeatedly misrepresented the U.S. position, obliging the United States to respond in public. They inaccurately portrayed the U.S. view on the need to reduce offensive nuclear forces as a precondition for the talks, while making acceptance of their own suggestion of a mutual moratorium on ASAT tests itself tantamount to a precondition. The United States made clear that possible mutual restraints would be an appropriate subjects for the negotiations; however, neither this outcome nor any other should be prejudged before talks begin. The United States remains ready to begin talks without preconditions, at whatever time is agreeable to the Soviets.

Nuclear Testing

Restraint in nuclear testing has long been considered an important step toward controlling nuclear arms competition. Since the 1950s, successive U.S. Administrations have sought verifiable limitations on nuclear testing that would contribute to arms control while providing the ability to maintain an adequate deterrent. These efforts have been pursued in a variety of channels, including UN bodies and tripartite negotiations among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

In 1963, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed to halt nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. In 1974 and 1976, the United States and the Soviet Union also signed the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties limiting the size of underground nuclear explosions.

Agreement on a more comprehensive test ban, however, has been inhibited by concerns about the proper relationship of such a ban to other arms control issues as well as to the overall East-West military balance and the need to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. East and West also disagree over how best to ensure compliance with specific testing limitations and prohibitions. The United States is, therefore, seeking to strengthen two of the existing treaties.

Introduction

Except for negotiations on limiting nuclear forces, no arms control endeavor since World War II has generated such sustained international interest as the issue of nuclear testing. Concern about radioactive fallout in the 1950s spurred efforts to halt testing, as the nature and effects of fallout became better understood and as it became apparent that no region was untouched by radioactive debris.

Efforts to negotiate an international agreement ending nuclear tests began in the UN Disarmament Commission in May 1955. Since then, a comprehensive test ban, or related issues, have been pursued in various forums and in trilateral negotiations involving the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. In all of these efforts, however, a central and persistent barrier to a treaty limiting tests has been the issue of verifying compliance to ensure against testing in secret. Another important factor has been the role of testing in maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent.

The Soviet Union historically has taken the position that national technical means, combined with mutual pledges that limits would be observed, are sufficient to verify compliance. The United States consistently has sought negotiated means of assuring that any nuclear testing agreement would not be vulnerable to clandestine violation. Given the difficulties of detecting underground tests and distinguishing such tests from other seismic events, these means have included the use of seismic instruments and onsite inspections.

Testing Moratorium

The danger—both to Western security and to progress toward genuine arms control—of failing to provide for effective means of verification in arms control agreements was underscored by the fate of an international testing moratorium. Implemented unilaterally by the United States, Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom in 1958, the moratorium held until 1961. During that time, however, the Soviet Union began preparing secretly for the largest series of nuclear explosions ever conducted. On August 20, 1961, the Soviet Union announced that it would resume testing and, on the following day, began the first of 40 atmospheric tests conducted over a 2-month period. The United States and the United Kingdom proposed on September 3, 1961, that all atmospheric tests be ended without any requirement for international control. On September 15, with Soviet tests continuing, the United States declared that it would resume testing.

These Soviet tests ended the moratorium and represented a clear breach of faith, prompting President Kennedy to note: "We know enough now about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and long test series never again to offer an uninspected moratorium."

Limited Test Ban Treaty

Nevertheless, efforts to achieve a test ban continued. A three-power (United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R.) conference met in almost continuous session

for over 3 years, beginning in October 1958. It adjourned in January 1962, unable to complete drafting of a treaty because the Soviets insisted that national means of detection were sufficient to monitor testing. Further efforts in the 18-nation Disarmament Committee—a forerunner of today's Conference on Disarmament—also ended in frustration. Nevertheless, three-party negotiations resumed in the summer of 1963. The Soviets began to shift toward a Western proposal, advanced the year before, for a ban on testing in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space—environments in which both sides agreed that existing verification technology was adequate. Because long years of discussion had clarified the issues, a treaty was negotiated within 10 days and ratified in October 1963.

The parties to the Limited Test Ban Treaty—originally the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union—agreed not to carry out any nuclear weapon test or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, under water, or in outer space, or in any other environment if the explosion would send radioactive debris beyond the border of the country conducting the test. The treaty is of unlimited duration and has been signed by nearly 125 nations.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty

An important follow-on to the Limited Test Ban Treaty came with the negotiation in the 1970s of the U.S.-Soviet Threshold Test Ban Treaty signed in 1972. In this treaty, both parties agreed not to conduct nuclear weapons tests of any type with planned yields exceeding 150 kilotons. The 150-kiloton threshold was designed to help maintain the strategic balance between the United States and the U.S.S.R. by inhibiting the development of new, high-yield warheads that could be fitted to new, highly accurate missiles.

The United States and the Soviet Union also agreed to apply a similar threshold of 150 kilotons to their underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. This agreement was formalized in the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1974, which also set various aggregate limits on multiple underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It is a necessary complement to the threshold test ban, because there is no essential distinction between the technology used to produce a nuclear weapon and that used for explosions for peaceful purposes.

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty were submitted to the U.S. Senate on July 29, 1976, for advice and consent to ratification. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations conducted hearings on them during the summer of 1977, but the treaties have never been acted upon by the full Senate. However, both the United States and the Soviet Union have declared their intention to abide by the 150-kiloton testing threshold of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty provided that the other side does so as well.

Monitoring estimates of a number of Soviet nuclear tests since 1976 have indicated yields in excess of the permitted 150-kiloton limits. In response to formal U.S. queries, the Soviets repeatedly have claimed that they are observing the 150-kiloton limit. Although a definitive conclusion cannot be reached—given the ambiguities in the available evidence—Soviet threshold violations are likely for a number of tests. President Reagan communicated that finding to Congress in his January 1984 report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements.

The United States is seeking verification improvements that would significantly enhance our ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. On numerous occasions, the United States has sought unsuccessfully to engage the Soviet Union in talks on such improvements. The Soviets claim that if the United States ratifies both treaties and implements their verification provisions, U.S. verification and compliance concerns would be resolved. But there is clear reason to doubt such claims. For example, no provision exists in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty for independent validation of the data to be exchanged upon ratification. The United States, therefore, continues to believe that verification procedures for the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties need strengthening.

Comprehensive Test Ban

From 1977 through 1980, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union met periodically to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. The three parties failed to reach agreement on several major issues, including verification. The specific verification issues involved the conditions for carrying out onsite inspections and the use of seismic equipment on the territory of each monitored party.

The United States has decided not to resume trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban at this time. In order to secure progress in this area, however, the United States agreed in 1982 to the formation of a working group in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva with a mandate to discuss issues related to verification and compliance with any future comprehensive test ban.

Conclusion

Achieving a ban on all nuclear weapons tests remains a long-term U.S. goal. A test ban by itself cannot end the nuclear threat. It is important that such a ban be verifiable and that it come into force in circumstances in which it can contribute to peace and stability. A complete cessation of nuclear tests must be viewed in the context of broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions; improved verification capabilities; expanded confidence-building measures; and the maintenance of an effective deterrent. The United States has, therefore, given arms control priority for now to achievement of significant, equitable, and verifiable arms reductions, and to strengthening verification measures for existing agreements on the limitation of nuclear testing.

Limitations on underground tests pose a difficult verification challenge. Efforts to improve our ability to verify a ban on underground nuclear explosions have continued since the Limited Test Ban Treaty entered into force, and the United States has invested more than $500 million in research and development to improve seismic and other monitoring techniques. Even so, the need for effective verification measures beyond national means was underscored by a report of the UN Secretary General on a comprehensive test ban to the Committee on Disarmament (March 24, 1980). The report noted that:

> . . . secret underground testing may provide a military advantage to a violator, and it may not be possible to obtain, through the parties' own means alone, assurance that the prohibition is being observed. Provision for verification by both national and international means must, therefore, be made in a treaty banning all underground nuclear tests.

Nuclear Nonproliferation

The international community long has recognized that an increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons could lead to greater risks of conflict. For this reason, just as the United States has long been committed to stemming the "vertical" proliferation of nuclear weaponry (that is, the increase in the arsenals of states already possessing nuclear weapons), it has since 1945 been dedicated to preventing the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons among non-nuclear-weapon states.

Origins of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

No arms control agenda could effectively limit the risk of conflict and the danger of nuclear escalation if it did not include a well-thought-out program to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus the United States and many other nations have worked to promote peaceful nuclear programs while preventing, to the extent possible, the spread of nuclear weapons. Indeed, halting the spread of nuclear weapons and guiding nuclear development toward peaceful ends have been central policy objectives of every U.S. Administration since 1945.

As early as 1946, the United States, then the world's only nuclear power, proposed the Baruch Plan for the international control of nuclear technology. Under this plan, the United States would have given up all its nuclear weapons. However, the Soviets rejected this initiative. U.S. efforts today center on strengthening the international nonproliferation regime in several ways: through the institutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency; the legal framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Treaty of Tlatelolco; cooperation among major nuclear supplier countries; and the legislative and policy structure of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. President Reagan underscored his Administration's commitment to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons—and to working with all other nations toward that end—in his March 31, 1983, arms control speech in Los Angeles, as well as his July 1, 1983, statement marking the 15th anniversary of the NPT.

Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

At the end of World War II, the Truman Administration and the American scientific community understood that the Manhattan Project to develop atomic weapons was based upon concepts in theoretical physics known by scientists for some time. Thus the highly dangerous prospect of nuclear proliferation became a priority item on the political agenda of the United States and all other nations.

As a result, the United States in 1946 proposed the Baruch Plan, which offered to surrender U.S. nuclear technology to an international authority that would develop its peaceful applications and prohibit military uses through a system of control and inspections. The Soviet Union rejected this offer. Faced with the need to address the dangers of proliferation, the United States imposed strict controls on nuclear exports with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

President Eisenhower made a dramatic innovation in this policy in December 1953, when, in a famous UN speech, he inaugurated his "atoms for peace" program. The President offered to assist other countries in developing nuclear energy in return for pledges to use nuclear technology solely for peaceful purposes. U.S. assistance took the form of research reactors, hardware,

technical assistance, and training for thousands of scientists and engineers. Subsequently, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 eliminated the U.S. Government monopoly on nuclear technology and opened the way for the domestic use of nuclear energy for generating electricity and for private industrial and medical applications under a formal licensing process.

Key Elements of the Nonproliferation Regime

International Atomic Energy Agency. The "atoms for peace" proposal was the precursor of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which the United States worked hard to establish and through which the ideas contained in President Eisenhower's initiative were developed. The IAEA, formed in 1957, has two complementary purposes:

- To promote the peaceful application and uses of atomic energy; and
- To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that these technologies are not used for military purposes.

IAEA safeguards are now being applied to civil nuclear facilities in 50 non-nuclear-weapon states. These states agree to file regular reports with the agency about their use of nuclear materials and equipment and to allow the use of containment and surveillance devices, such as seals and cameras, at the safeguarded facilities. Periodic on-site inspections are conducted by international officials employed by the IAEA to confirm that nuclear materials are not being diverted to nonpeaceful applications.

The United States regularly contributes about one-third of the IAEA's operating budget through voluntary and assessed contributions. In September 1982, after an illegal vote denied the credentials of the Israeli delegation to the IAEA General Conference, the United States withdrew from participation and reassessed its role in the agency. The Reagan Administration decided to resume participation in February 1983, while making clear that it expected the IAEA to conduct itself in accordance with the provisions of its charter, including the principle of universality. The U.S. goal is to strengthen the IAEA and make its safeguards system comprehensive and universal.

Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1961, the Government of Ireland, reflecting growing concern about the dangers of proliferation, proposed at the United Nations an international agreement to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. With U.S. and Soviet support, this initiative evolved into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was completed in 1968 and went into force in 1970.

To date, the treaty has been ratified by 124 countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. Nuclear-weapon states that ratify are pledged to give no aid to non-nuclear-weapon states to develop nuclear explosives. In turn, the non-nuclear-weapon states renounce manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosives and agree to place all of their nuclear facilities under international safeguards and to open them to international inspection. The United States continues to encourage nonparties to adhere to the treaty. Every 5 years a review conference is held to examine the operation of the treaty; the next will be in August-September 1985. The U.S. objective is to ensure that this conference reaffirms the importance of the NPT to international security.

Nuclear Supplier Cooperation. Although the combination of NPT and IAEA safeguards worked satisfactorily, by the mid-1970s technological developments led to heightened concern about the adequacy of the existing safeguards regime. Together with the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974, this concern led the United States to begin discussions with other nuclear suppliers (including the Soviet Union, several West European countries, Canada, and Japan) to tighten the rules and procedures for the export of nuclear supplies, components, and technology. In 1978, the 15 nations involved in what became known as the London Suppliers Group agreed to permit the IAEA to publish a set of general principles governing their future nuclear exports. These norms, although still imperfect, have continued to be refined and broadened, and much progress has been made in their coverage and specificity in recent years. The United States is determined to continue consultations with other supplier countries to develop rules and restraints for the export of sensitive nuclear technologies, material, and equipment.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). In addition to the NPT, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed in Mexico City in 1967, is a mainstay of the international nonproliferation regime in Latin America and the Caribbean. The treaty, the only one to provide for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in a populated region, is now in force for 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries. In addition to the main provision prohibiting development or use of nuclear weapons by regional states, two additional protocols call on states outside the region to respect the denuclearization provisions of the zone:

- Protocol I applies to nations outside the treaty zone having possessions within it. It is currently in force for the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.
- Protocol II applies to nuclear-weapon states. They undertake to respect the denuclearized status of the treaty zone, not to contribute to violations by other parties to the treaty, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty. It is the only nuclear arms control agreement in force to which all five nuclear-weapon states are parties.

The United States fully supports the goals and objectives of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and hopes that those few states which have not yet adhered to it will do so.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act was signed into law by President Carter on March 10, 1978. It established specific criteria for nuclear exports and strict procedures for the approval of exports. It also provides a stronger congressional role in U.S. export policy. Under the act, non-nuclear-weapon countries seeking U.S. reactors or nuclear fuel must accept IAEA safeguards on all of their peaceful nuclear facilities—so-called full-scope or comprehensive safeguards.

Current U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

On July 16, 1981, President Reagan outlined the U.S. approach to international nuclear cooperation and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. The United States would:

- Seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries as a basic national security and foreign policy objective;
- Strive to reduce the motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives by improving regional and global stability and promoting understanding of the legitimate security concerns of other states;

• Continue to support adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco by countries that have not accepted them;

• View a violation of those treaties or of an international safeguards agreement as having profound consequences for international order and U.S. bilateral relations and view any nuclear explosion by a non-nuclear-weapon state with grave concern;

• Cooperate with other nations to strengthen the IAEA and its safeguards system;

• Work with other nations to combat the risks of proliferation; and

• Continue to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment, and technology, particularly where the danger of proliferation exists, and seek agreement requiring IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states as a condition for any significant new nuclear supply commitment.

At the same time, the President announced that the United States would not inhibit civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development in countries with advanced nuclear power programs where this would not constitute a proliferation risk. He also ordered an intensive interagency review of policies under which the United States exercises its consent rights over reprocessing of U.S.-origin fuel and plutonium use in other countries. As a result, the United States is attempting to work out procedures with Japan and the European Atomic Energy Community for advance long-term consent to retransfers, reprocessing, and use of nuclear material over which the United States has consent rights.

The President underscored the linkage between arms control and nuclear nonproliferation in a March 31, 1983, address in Los Angeles:

> For arms control to be truly complete and world security strengthened . . . we must also increase our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Every country that values a peaceful world must play its part.

He then renewed his call for comprehensive safeguards by all nuclear suppliers as a condition for future nuclear exports. The United States continues to consult closely with other nuclear suppliers on this key question.

Conclusion

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons will remain one of the U.S. Government's most urgent national security priorities. Through the maintenance and strengthening of the existing international nonproliferation regime, the United States is working to secure this objective. The United States will continue to seek the cooperation and support of the Soviet Union and other countries in the effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

White House (Jack Kightlinger)

President Reagan presents the broad range of U.S. arms control initiatives in a speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, March 31, 1983.

The Road Ahead: Prospects and Problems

The history of arms control efforts provides ample basis for hope and caution. Major strides have been achieved over the last 30 years in securing international agreements restricting the development, stockpiling, and use of various forms of armaments. These include the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1970, and the SALT I agreements of 1972.

However, the growth of nuclear and conventional arms continues, and some dangerous quantitative and qualitative imbalances have arisen. Arms control negotiations designed specifically to avert or correct this process have either been disappointing, as in SALT II, or, as in the negotiations on conventional forces in Central Europe and on chemical weapons, failed so far to produce substantive results. In November 1983, the Soviet Union suspended the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear force reductions and in December 1983 refused to set a resumption date for START. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. has violated or probably violated several of its existing legal obligations and political commitments in the arms control field.

Success in achieving balanced and verifiable arms control agreements that make a real contribution to global stability and security requires Western patience, persistence, and unity. Failure or disappointment has resulted when Western governments succumbed to confused objectives, divided counsel, and pressure for quick results.

The Soviet Union is a closed society depending heavily on military force to sustain its international position. This makes meaningful arms control difficult. At the same time, the enormous destructive capacity of the United States and the Soviet Union makes arms control all the more necessary. We cannot assume, however, that the Soviet Union shares our perceptions or our objectives.

Careful, patient negotiations directed toward specific, well-defined ends can lead to constructive agreements that enhance the security of the parties to these accords and mankind as a whole. The United States and its allies have led in these endeavors for more than 30 years. We are making serious and far-reaching efforts today to reduce nuclear and conventional arms, to achieve a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons, and to forge new bilateral and multilateral confidence-building measures. The pursuit of a more stable peace through a vigorous arms reductions program is an essential part of collective efforts to strengthen Western security and will remain among the highest priorities of the U.S. Government.

ARMS CONTROL GLOSSARY

ABM system—Antiballistic missile, a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements during flight.

Ballistic missile—Any missile that does not rely upon aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift and consequently follows a ballistic trajectory when thrust is terminated. Ballistic missiles typically operate outside the atmosphere for a substantial portion of their flight path and are unpowered during most of their flight.

Biological warfare—Employment of living organisms or toxic biological products to produce death or casualties.

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)—Measures designed to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding of military activities, to reduce the possibility of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or the failure of communication, and to increase stability in times of both normal circumstances and crisis.

Cooperative measures—Measures taken by one side in order to enhance the other side's ability to monitor and/or verify compliance with the provisions of an agreement.

Counterforce—The employment of strategic nuclear forces in an effort to destroy, or disable, selected military capabilities of an enemy force.

Crisis stability—A strategic relationship in which neither side has an incentive to initiate the use of force in a crisis.

Cruise missile—A guided missile using aerodynamic lift that sustains powered flight through the atmosphere to its target.

Dual-capable weapons—Those systems capable of delivering either conventional or nuclear weapons.

Encryption—The encoding of communications or other data (e.g., telemetric data) for the purpose of concealing information.

Equivalent megatonnage—A measure used to compare the potential to cause destruction of different nuclear warhead yields.

Escalation—An increase in scope or violence of a conflict or crisis.

Flexible response—A strategy to deter and, should deterrence fail, to counter aggression at varying levels with appropriate forces.

Hardened site—A site constructed to withstand the blast and associated effects of a nuclear attack.

Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)—A land-based fixed or mobile rocket-propelled vehicle capable of delivering a warhead to intercontinental ranges defined in SALT I and II as ranges in excess of 5,500 kilometers.

Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)—Land-based missiles and aircraft with ranges/combat radius between short-range nuclear forces and 5,500 km that are capable of striking targets beyond the general region of the battlefield but not capable of intercontinental range.

Kiloton—Nuclear yield equal to that of 1,000 tons of TNT.

Megaton—Nuclear yield equal to that of 1 million tons of TNT.

Monitoring—Function of collecting, analyzing, and reporting data on the activities of the parties to an arms control agreement.

Multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)—Multiple reentry vehicles carried by a ballistic missile, each of which can be directed to a separate target.

Multiple reentry vehicle (MRV)—The reentry vehicle of a ballistic missile which is equipped with multiple warheads but which does not have the capability of independently directing the reentry vehicles to separate targets.

National technical means (NTM)—Assets under national control for monitoring compliance with the provision of an agreement. NTM include photographic reconnaissance satellites, aircraft-based systems (such as radars and optical systems), as well as sea- and ground-based systems such as radars and antennas for collecting telemetry.

Payload—The weapons and penetration aids carried by a delivery vehicle.

Qualitative limitations—Restrictions on capabilities or characteristics of a weapons system as distinct from quantitative limits (e.g., on numbers of strategic delivery vehicles).

Quantitative limitations—Limits on the number of weapons systems in certain categories, as distinct from qualitative limits on weapons capabilities.

Reentry vehicle (RV)—That portion (or portions) of a ballistic missile, containing a nuclear warhead, which reenters the earth's atmosphere in the terminal portion of the missile's trajectory.

Short-range Nuclear Forces (SNF)—Land-based missiles, rockets, and artillery that are capable of striking only targets in the general region of the battlefield.

Special Consultative Group (SCG)—The NATO forum for review of the course of the INF negotiations and for consultation on any U.S. steps in those talks.

Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)—A permanent U.S.-Soviet commission established in accordance with the SALT I agreements. Its purpose is to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the various treaties and agreements achieved between the United States and the U.S.S.R. to which it is assigned responsibility.

Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—A ballistic missile carried in and launched from a submarine.

Telemetry—Data transmitted by radio during a weapons test, reporting functions and performance.

Throw-weight—The useful weight placed on a trajectory toward the target by the boost or main propulsion stages of the missile.

Verification—The process of determining whether parties to an agreement are in compliance with their obligations.

Warhead—The part of a missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket, or other munition containing either the nuclear or the thermonuclear system, high explosive system, chemical or biological agents, or inert materials intended to inflict damage.

Yield—The energy released in an explosion. The energy released in the detonation of a nuclear weapon is generally measured in terms of the kilotons or megatons of TNT required to produce the same energy release.

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